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Article 
Tie Votes in the Supreme Court 
Justin Pidot† 
  INTRODUCTION   
What should the Supreme Court do with a tie vote? Since 
at least 1792, the Court has followed the rule that where the 
Justices are evenly divided, the lower court’s decision is af-
firmed, and the Supreme Court’s order has no precedential ef-
fect.1 Such cases are unusual but hardly scarce. Since 1866, an 
odd number of Justices have composed the Supreme Court, and 
when an odd number of individuals vote, that vote typically 
doesn’t result in a tie.2 Yet due to death, retirement, or recusal, 
there have been 164 tie votes in the Supreme Court between 
1925 and 2015.3 These ties have largely, but not entirely, gone 
unnoticed, in part because few of them involved particularly 
contentious cases in the eye of the public.4 
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I 
would like to thank Bob Bone, Alan Chen, Lee Epstein, Tara Leigh Grove, Lee 
Kovarsky, Nancy Leong, Margaret Kwoka, Alan Morrison, Jim Pfander, Ju-
dith Resnick, Allan Stein, and Ben Spencer for sharing their insights and also 
my research assistant Courtney McVean for all of her help. Copyright © 2016 
by Justin Pidot. 
 1. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792); see also United 
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942). 
 2. Peter G. Fish, Justices, Number of, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 550, 550 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d 
ed. 2005). The Judiciary Act of 1869 established the current nine-member Su-
preme Court. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. 
 3. This number is derived from an original data set of Supreme Court 
cases created for this Article. That data set is described below. See infra Part 
II. 
 4. But see Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court “Supreme,” 
4 GREEN BAG 2d 129, 129 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s failure to de-
cide a case that “raised an arcane but important issue of civil procedure”). 
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October Term 2015 may thrust Supreme Court ties into the 
limelight.5 The death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 
2016, and the likelihood that his seat will not be filled until af-
ter the presidential election,6 raises the specter that the Court 
could be entering a period in which an unprecedented number 
of high-profile cases end in four Justices voting one way and 
four Justices voting the other way.7 These include high-profile 
and contentious cases about public sector unions,8 the meaning 
of one person, one vote,9 the Obama administration’s policy of 
deferring deportation for certain immigrants without legal sta-
tus,10 and accommodations for religious organizations that ob-
ject to the contraceptive mandate of Obamacare.11 Unlike the 
circumstances of the past, should these cases result in tie votes, 
the media, politicians from all parties, and the public will be 
paying close attention.12 
 
 5. See Erwin Chemerinsky, New Term’s Most Important Cases—So Far, 
A.B.A. J. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky 
_a_new_term. 
 6. See Harper Neidig, McConnell: Don’t Replace Scalia Until After Elec-
tion, THE HILL (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.thehill.com/homenews/senate/ 
269389-mcconnell-dont-replace-scalia-until-after-election. 
 7. As this Article was being edited, the Supreme Court’s October Term 
2015 drew to a close. I discuss the five tie votes that occurred during this peri-
od in an epilogue that follows the conclusion. All told, these decisions generally 
fall in line with the empirical results I report. Tie votes did, however, occur in 
very high-profile cases, underscoring the risk this procedural mechanism pos-
es to the Court’s perceived legitimacy. In other cases, the Justices did act with 
creativity to avoid a deadlock, although they did not exercise the procedure 
advocated for in this Article. 
 8. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 
(9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (June 30, 2015) (No. 14-
915). 
 9. Evenwel v. Perry, 2014 WL 5780507 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014), cert. 
granted sub nom., Evenwel v. Abbott, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (May 26, 2015) (No. 14-
940). 
 10. United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 
S. Ct. 906 (Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674). 
 11. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 
422 (3rd Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 
(Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 14-1418). 
 12. The death of Justice Antonin Scalia has likely ended the potential for 
a tie vote in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (June 29, 2015) (No. 14-981), the Court’s 
most recent foray into affirmative action in higher education. Justice Elena 
Kagan recused herself from that case because the United States filed an ami-
cus brief in its early iteration while she served as solicitor general. See Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court Justices’ Comments Don’t Bode Well for Affirmative 
Action, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/ 
politics/supreme-court-to-revisit-case-that-may-alter-affirmative-action.html?_ 
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The potential for a string of high-profile ties comes at a bad 
time for the Supreme Court. On October 2, 2015, a Gallup poll 
reported that the Court’s disapproval rating had reached fifty 
percent for the first time in decades.13 This waning popularity 
may have a variety of sources. The public’s increasing skepti-
cism comes in the wake of a number of high-profile opinions 
that have divided the country—Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission14 and Obergefell v. Hodges15 being two of the 
most prominent. As Eric Posner has described it, “The court 
has never been more aggressive about resolving the country’s 
political debates. And yet it is ideologically polarized and more 
unpopular than it has been in quite a while.”16 Moreover, the 
frequency of polarizing decisions that involve five-to-four votes 
along predictable ideological lines may contribute to the public 
perception that the Supreme Court has become a political insti-
 
r=1. With only seven Justices remaining on the case, a tie vote appears unlike-
ly unless an additional unforeseen circumstance transpires. 
 13. Justin McCarthy, Disapproval of Supreme Court Edges to New High, 
GALLUP (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185972/disapproval 
-supreme-court-edges-new-high.aspx. 
 14. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). In Citi-
zens United, the Court struck down campaign finance limits for corporations, a 
decision that has sparked considerable backlash among progressives, see, e.g., 
Mimi Marziani, Growing Backlash Against ‘Citizens United,’ NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 
23, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202539063421/Growing 
-backlash-against-Citizens-United, even prompting Professor Larry Lessig to 
briefly run for President for the sole purpose of reforming the campaign fi-
nance system. Philip Rucker, Lawrence Lessig Wants To Run for President – in 
a Most Unconventional Way, WASH. POST. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/08/11/lawrence-lessig-wants 
-to-run-for-president-in-a-most-unconventional-way. Lessig ended his candida-
cy a few months later when he was not allowed to participate in the Democrat-
ic debates. David Weigel, Larry Lessig Ends Presidential Campaign, Citing 
Unfair Debate Rules, WASH. POST. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/11/02/larry-lessig-ends-presidential-campaign 
-citing-unfair-debate-rules. 
 15. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In Obergefell, the Su-
preme Court recognized that same sex couples have a fundamental right to 
marry. Some states have considered outright refusing to comply with the deci-
sion. A bill introduced in the Tennessee legislature would have declared the 
opinion “void and of no effect,” although the bill was killed in a legislative 
committee. Richard Locker, Bill To Ban Same-Sex Marriage in Tennessee Dies 
in House Subcommittee, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www 
.commercialappeal.com/news/government/state/bill-purporting-to-ban-same 
-sex-marriage-in-tennessee-fails-in-house-subcommittee-29c7779e-5f66-1172 
-365978971.html. 
 16. Eric Posner, The Supreme Court’s Loss of Prestige, SLATE (Oct. 7, 
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/ 
2015/10/the_supreme_court_is_losing_public_approval_and_prestige.html. 
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tution rather than a legal institution.17 Chief Justice John Rob-
erts has identified a related, but distinct, culprit, arguing that 
the public’s negative perception of the Court is collateral dam-
age to an increasingly divisive and polarized political war be-
tween Republicans and Democrats.18 Whatever the cause, 
should the Court be unable to resolve some of the important 
and high-profile cases on its docket, that failure will surely fur-
ther dampen public confidence in the institution. 
The Supreme Court may have few tools at its disposal to 
address this crisis in confidence. The Court as an institution 
can’t change the fact that the Justices disagree sharply; and 
because they decide cases of importance, those disagreements 
will become grist for political candidates and parties. There 
may, however, be modest reforms that the Court can undertake 
to enhance its legitimacy, and the Court has shown its willing-
ness to make such adjustments. For example, a recent article 
by Richard Lazarus revealed the Supreme Court’s practice of 
revising decisions after their release without notice to the par-
ties or the public, a practice of secrecy that made “it hard for 
anyone to determine when changes are made.”19 In response, 
the Supreme Court implemented a new, more transparent poli-
cy.20 
As this Article will discuss, tie votes are an area in which 
modest reform could increase the public’s confidence in the 
Court. Scholars, lawmakers, and even two Justices have ex-
pressed concern about the potential for ongoing confusion in 
 
 17. A survey carried out by the Pew Research Center found that seventy 
percent of Americans believe that Justices “are often influenced by their own 
political views.” Negative Views of Supreme Court at Record High, Driven by 
Republican Dissatisfaction, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 29, 2015), http://www 
.people-press.org/2015/07/29/negative-views-of-supreme-court-at-record-high 
-driven-by-republican-dissatisfaction. Over the last decade, the Court has de-
cided five-to-four votes along ideological lines almost seventy percent of the 
time. See Kedar Bhatia, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2014, 
SCOTUSBLOG, 22–25 (June 30, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_5-4cases_OT14.pdf. 
 18. Robert Barnes, The Political Wars Damage Public Perception of Su-
preme Court, Chief Justice Roberts Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/the-political-wars-damage-public 
-perception-of-supreme-court-chief-justice-roberts-says/2016/02/04/80e718b6 
-cb0c-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html. 
 19. Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 608 (2014). 
 20. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Plans To Highlight Revisions in Its 
Opinions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/us/ 
politics/supreme-court-to-highlight-revisions-in-its-opinions.html. 
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the lower courts when the Supreme Court becomes deadlocked, 
and some have suggested that a tie-breaker substitute Justice 
should be appointed to ensure that every case has a definitive 
and precedential outcome.21 In explaining his decision not to 
recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum, then-Justice William 
Rehnquist explained that where the courts of appeals had ar-
rived at different conclusions about the resolution of a legal is-
sue, “affirmance of each of such conflicting results by an equal-
ly divided Court would lay down ‘one rule in Athens, and 
another rule in Rome’ with a vengeance.”22 Upon his retire-
ment, Justice John Paul Stevens also worried about tie votes 
and their effect on the development of the law, reportedly sug-
gesting that a law be enacted allowing a retired Justice to re-
join the Supreme Court where necessary to prevent an affir-
mance by equal division.23 Shortly thereafter, Senator Patrick 
Leahy, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, intro-
duced just such legislation24 although it has never been enact-
ed. 
Tie votes, then, could cause mischief by leaving legal issues 
undecided, although as the original empirical data presented in 
this Article demonstrate, such mischief appears to be mini-
mal.25 Tie votes also pose a threat to the Court’s legitimacy. Tie 
votes are, in effect, an admission that the Justices have failed 
to fulfill their constitutionally assigned job responsibilities be-
cause they could find no manner of resolving a case that was 
acceptable to a majority of them. Tie votes also have the un-
seemly effect, at least in some cases, of recording the views of 
the Justices on a particular matter without resolving that mat-
ter or creating guidance for the lower courts.26 The public bri-
dles when Supreme Court Justices make statements that ap-
 
 21. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Division in 
the Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 38–
41 (1983). 
 22. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, 
J., denying motion for disqualification). 
 23. 156 CONG. REC. S7793 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 24. S. 3871, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 25. See infra Part IV.A. 
 26. This practice resembles an advisory opinion, which, since the early 
days of the republic, the Court has held is outside its jurisdiction. See Justin 
Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure]. 
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pear to prejudge cases,27 and the affirmance by an equally di-
vided court can have that effect. Finally, by casting a vote in a 
case that results in a tie, individual Justices may bind them-
selves to a position, affecting their judgment in a subsequent 
case raising the same issue.28 All of these problems counsel 
against the practice of affirming by an equally divided Court. 
This Article provides the first systematic empirical study of 
cases that resulted in a tie vote, considering every such case—
164 in total—between 1925 and 2015. Those data permit exam-
ination of two issues. First, is the practice of affirming by equal 
division necessary because it occurs in cases where the Su-
preme Court exercises mandatory jurisdiction? Second, does 
the Court’s failure to resolve the legal issues presented in cases 
where it affirms by equal division create prolonged and severe 
confusion in lower courts? 
The data presented in this Article indicate a negative an-
swer to both of those questions. The vast majority of ties have 
occurred in cases that would arise under the Court’s discretion-
ary certiorari jurisdiction today, and the failure of the Court to 
issue precedential decisions in such cases is relatively inconse-
quential. 
Based on those considerations, and a variety of concerns 
about the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court, the 
Court could and should do away with its practice of affirming 
by an equally divided Court almost entirely. Instead, this Arti-
cle calls on the Justices to utilize an alternative procedure: 
where the Court has granted a writ of certiorari, the vehicle by 
which virtually all modern cases join the Court’s docket, the 
court can subsequently terminate cases where the Justices 
head for a deadlock by dismissing the writ as improvidently 
granted, a procedure commonly referred to as the DIG.29 
 
 27. For example, some called for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to recuse 
herself in the Obergefell case because of public comments she had made that 
appeared to favor same sex marriage. Cheryl Wetzstein, Justice Ginsburg 
Asked To Recuse Herself in Supreme Court Gay Marriage Case, WASH. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/13/justice 
-ginsburg-asked-to-recuse-herself-in-suprem. 
 28. See infra Part IV.B. 
 29. See Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the 
Sophisticated Use of DIGs, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 155, 155 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Solimine & Gely, Sophisticated Use of DIGs]; Richard L. Revesz & Pamela 
S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 
1082 (1988). 
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To establish that the DIG is preferable to the affirmance by 
equal division, this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I pro-
vides an overview of the Supreme Court’s procedure for affirm-
ing by equal division and DIGing. This background contextual-
izes both procedures and sets the stage for the analysis that 
follows. 
Part II provides an empirical analysis of the 164 affir-
mances by equal division issued between 1925 and 2015. The 
data set begins in 1925 because in that year Congress signifi-
cantly adjusted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, shifting cate-
gories of cases from the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdic-
tion to its certiorari jurisdiction.30 The data reported in Part II 
reveal that virtually every case—all but one—in which the 
Court has affirmed by equal division would today arise under a 
writ of certiorari. As a result, the Court could, if it so choose, 
almost always DIG cases where a tie vote occurred. 
Part III develops a typology of the orders the Court has is-
sued affirming by equal division. The majority of these orders 
reveal nothing about the breakdown of the votes of the Justices 
or the basis for disagreement although these orders do reveal 
the identity of any Justice recused from the case. This is not, 
however, always the situation. Part III identifies other forms 
by which the Court has affirmed by equal division, some of 
which prove troubling because they involve public statements 
by Justices about their views of legal issues even though the 
Court issues no precedential decision in the case. 
Part IV provides a close examination of twenty-five years 
of tie votes to ascertain whether the Court’s failure to defini-
tively resolve the issues in those cases resulted in a persistent 
and significant split of authority among the lower courts. The 
data suggest that most tie votes are relatively inconsequential 
because the issues involved either return to the Supreme Court 
in relatively short order or there was no split of authority to 
begin with. 
Part V identifies problems with orders that affirm by equal 
division that could be ameliorated by use of the DIG. The cur-
rent practice threatens public perceptions of the Court’s legiti-
macy and may lead Justices to prejudge future cases. Because 
 
 30. See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. Prior to the 1925 Ju-
diciary Act, the ratio of cases arising under the Supreme Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction and discretionary jurisdiction was approximately four to one; after 
the Act the ratio reversed. See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Su-
preme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 87 (1988). 
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the DIG would avoid these costs, the Justices should embrace 
that procedure as the means of resolving cases where they 
deadlock. 
I.  SUPREME COURT PROCEDURES AND THE EQUALLY 
DIVIDED COURT   
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court abandon one 
procedure for dealing with tie votes—affirming by an equally 
divided court—in favor of another—the DIG. This Part provides 
a brief overview of both procedural mechanisms. 
A. AFFIRMANCE BY EQUAL DIVISION 
The Supreme Court has long applied the rule that where 
the Justices reach a tie vote on the judgment in a case, the low-
er court’s opinion is affirmed.31 Such a decision binds the par-
ties, but has no precedential value.32 
The Court first dealt with a tie vote in 1792. The Supreme 
Court’s participation in Hayburn’s Case, a famous case in 
which a lower federal court first found a congressional statute 
unconstitutional, was limited to equally dividing on a question 
of procedure.33 The case involved the Invalid Pensions Act of 
1792, which required federal circuit courts to determine pen-
 
 31. See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868). 
 32. Id.; see also Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
234 n.7 (1987) (“Of course, an affirmance by an equally divided Court is not 
entitled to precedential weight.”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 
(1941) (explaining that an affirmance by equal division is binding on the par-
ties to that litigation but no one else). In United States v. Hatter, the Court 
suggested that an affirmance by equal division might not always bind the par-
ties, 532 U.S. 557, 565–68 (2001). The Court explained that its prior decision 
applying law of the case doctrine to an affirmance by equal division involved 
“a case . . . in which [the] Court had heard oral argument and apparently con-
sidered the merits prior to concluding that affirmance by an equally divided 
Court was appropriate.” Id. at 566. The Court saw this as important because 
“[t]he law of the case doctrine presumes a hearing on the merits,” thereby sug-
gesting that a decision by equal affirmance issued prior to such a hearing on 
the merits would not have any preclusive effect. Id. at 558. 
 33. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). For an early account of 
Hayburn’s Case, see generally Max Farrand, The First Hayburn Case, 1792, 13 
AM. HIST. REV. 281 (1908). Maeva Marcus and Robert Teir have argued that 
Hayburn’s Case is widely misunderstood as a case involving separation of 
powers, when in truth the case involves an assessment of whether the presi-
dent vested the attorney general with authority to proceed in court. Maeva 
Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 
WIS. L. REV. 527, 542–46 (1988). 
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sions for disabled revolutionary war veterans.34 The federal cir-
cuit courts—staffed in part by Supreme Court Justices riding 
circuit—balked, concluding that Congress lacked the constitu-
tional power to require federal judges to engage in non-judicial 
activity.35 The first United States Attorney General, Edmund 
Randolph, filed a petition for mandamus asking the Supreme 
Court to direct the circuit courts to carry out the duties as-
signed to them by the Act.36 In so doing, Attorney General Ran-
dolph did not purport to represent any particular veteran who 
had been denied a pension but rather filed a motion to proceed 
ex officio, in other words, by virtue of his inherent authority as 
the Attorney General.37 The Supreme Court’s involvement be-
gan and ended with its resolution—or really, non-resolution—of 
this motion. As the Court explained, “THE COURT being divid-
ed in opinion on that question, the motion, made ex officio, was 
not allowed.”38 Before the Attorney General could secure a deci-
sion on a modified petition brought on behalf of William 
Hayburn, Congress amended the law.39 
The tie vote in Hayburn’s Case didn’t result in the affir-
mance of a lower court decision but rather denial of the Attor-
ney General’s motion. The principle embodied in the case, how-
ever, applies to situations where the Supreme Court reviews 
the decision of a lower court. Under the principle in Hayburn’s 
Case, the Court views itself as being unable to take affirmative 
action—including reversing the decision of a lower court—in 
the absence of a majority vote of the Justices.40 The Court has 
used this rule to affirm a decision of a lower court more than 
180 times in total.41 The procedure has been utilized in cases 
involving slavery,42 presidential elections,43 violations of anti-
trust laws,44 and criminal convictions.45 The Court generally is-
 
 34. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 409. 
 35. See id. at n.† (describing decisions by circuit courts for the districts of 
New York, which sat Chief Justice John Jay and Justice William Cushing; 
Pennsylvania, which sat Justices James Wilson and John Blair Jr.; and North 
Carolina, which sat Justice James Iredell). 
 36. Id. at 409. 
 37. Id.; see also Ex Officio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 38. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 409. 
 39. Id. at 409–10. 
 40. See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7. Wall.) 107, 111 (1868). 
 41. Data on file with author. 
 42. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
 43. See Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (per curiam). 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967) 
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sues its order “without much discussion,” as the Court once de-
scribed its analysis of the legal issue presented in The Antelope, 
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), the first instance in which the 
Court affirmed a lower court decision by a tie vote.46 Typically, 
the Court also avoids identifying who among the Justices cast 
which votes, because this cloak of anonymity “may well enable 
the next case presenting [a legal issue] to be approached with 
less commitment.”47 At times, however, the Court has diverged 
from this practice and identified precisely how the votes broke 
down in a particular case.48 At other times, particular Justices 
have written at length about their views of the lower court’s 
opinion notwithstanding the fact that a tie vote has disabled 
the Supreme Court from resolving the case.49 
The practice of affirming by equal division has caused con-
cern among the Justices and scholars. Such decisions cause 
“embarrassment” for the Supreme Court,50 which is forced to 
publicly admit that disagreement among its members has 
caused it to fail to fulfill its constitutional role.51 Such disposi-
tions are also inefficient, wasting resources of the Court itself 
and the advocates before it.52 And such decisions leave unset-
tled the legal issues presented, legal issues likely of high im-
portance or else they would never have reached the Supreme 
Court in the first place.53 Professor Caprice Roberts worries also 
that the possibility of affirmance by equal division may subcon-
sciously affect Justices’ decisions about recusal, causing them 
to participate in cases where they should properly disqualify 
themselves in order to avoid tie votes.54 
 
(per curiam); United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 339 U.S. 940 
(1950) (per curiam). 
 45. See, e.g., Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968) (per curiam); 
United States v. Am. Freightways Co., 352 U.S. 1020 (1957) (per curiam). 
 46. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972). 
 47. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960) (Brennan, J., con-
curring). 
 48. See Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
 49. See Standard Indus., Inc. v. Tigrett Indus., Inc., 397 U.S. 586 (1970) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (per curiam). 
 50. Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally 
Divided Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 82–83 (2005). 
 51. Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the 
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 174 
(2004). 
 52. See Black & Epstein, supra note 50, at 83. 
 53. Id. at 82–83. 
 54. See Roberts, supra note 51. 
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Because of these concerns, proposals for reform have occa-
sionally arisen over the years. William Reynolds and Gordon 
Young suggested that a tie vote, in some instances, should re-
sult in reversal of the lower court’s decision, rather than an af-
firmance.55 In their view, the Court should demark the territory 
of such reversals based on policy presumptions—including 
what they identify as a presumption of constitutionality and 
the presumption favoring criminal defendants.56 In other words, 
where a lower court holds a statute unconstitutional or affirms 
the conviction of a criminal defendant, a tie vote would reverse 
that judgment.57 
Thomas E. Baker, frustrated by the Court’s affirmance by 
equal division in Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., a case involv-
ing aggregation of claims and federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion, proposes a simpler solution.58 He notes that over the 
Court’s history, “some Justices not infrequently sublimated 
their judicial egos, suppressed their individual voices, and vot-
ed against themselves, so to speak, in particular cases, out of 
respect for the Court as an institution.”59 The Justices should 
apply similar self-restraint where the Court heads for a tie, be-
cause “[i]t is usually more important that a rule of law be set-
tled, than that it be settled right.”60 Thus, in such circumstance, 
Baker would have one or more Justices switch their votes to 
produce a majority decision.61 
Edward Hartnett has raised objections to the proposals of 
Reynolds and Young and Baker.62 He argues that a search for 
principles delineating those tie votes that should result in af-
firmances and those that should result in reversals would inject 
unnecessary confusion into the Court’s procedures, and the 
 
 55. Reynolds & Young, supra note 21, at 29. 
 56. Id. at 48–52. 
 57. Id. at 48–53. The authors acknowledge that these presumptions may 
sometimes conflict, and they urge the Justices to develop principled approach-
es to such circumstances. “Far more important than the analysis of particular 
categories of cases is the general conclusion that the Court should be aware of 
the possibility of identifying policies that by broad consensus of the Justices 
could be used to dispose of equal divisions in principled ways.” Id. at 53. 
 58. Baker, supra note 4, at 129–30 (criticizing Free v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam)). 
 59. Id. at 136. 
 60. Id. at 129 (quoting DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 61. Id. at 130. 
 62. Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 660–61 (2002). 
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Justices could also split evenly on how to apply such principles 
in any particular case.63 Hartnett also objects to the “folly” of 
vote switching as advocated for by Baker because where there 
are equal votes with regard to the judgment in a case, there is 
no principled means to determine which side should give way to 
the other.64 “Far better,” he concludes, “to adhere to the 
longstanding practice of affirmance by an equally divided Court 
and to wait for another case to present the issue for resolu-
tion.”65 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice John Paul 
Stevens suggested another approach that would eliminate tie 
votes where a Justice has recused herself, thereby resulting in 
an even number of Justices participating in a case.66 They 
urged Congress to pass a law allowing the Supreme Court to 
appoint retired Justices whenever one of the active Justices 
recuses herself, thereby returning to an odd number of partici-
pating Justices.67 Such a rule would follow the practice of some 
state supreme courts, which allow for the assignment of substi-
tute Justices.68 Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, followed the suggestion, introducing a 
bill to allow the Court, by majority vote, to designate a retired 
Justice to participate in a case where one of the active Justices 
is recused.69 The bill would have no effect on situations where 
the membership of the Court was depleted by death or retire-
ment, leaving an even number of Justices to consider a case.70 
Because Senator Leahy’s legislation dealt only with 
recusals, a number of scholars have similarly considered 
whether creating a special rule for recusals is either necessary 
or wise. Professors Lisa McElroy and Michael Dorf have pro-
 
 63. Id. at 660–61. 
 64. Id. at 667–68. 
 65. Id. at 669. 
 66. See Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming off the Bench: Legal 
and Policy Implications of Proposals To Allow Retired Justices To Sit by Des-
ignation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 83 n.7 (2011). 
 67. Id. at 81. 
 68. In California, for example, the chief justice may reassign a lower court 
judge to serve on the California Supreme Court in the event of a recusal. See 
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(e); Stephen R. Barnett & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The As-
signment of Temporary Justices in the California Supreme Court, 17 PAC. L.J. 
1045, 1045–46 (1986); Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justic-
es: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 673–74 n.78 (1996). 
 69. See S. 3871, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 70. Id. 
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vided an extensive critique of this proposal.71 Much like Caprice 
Roberts, they worry that such a procedure may skew recusal 
decisions: Justices may experience subconscious pressure not to 
recuse themselves if they believe a substitute Justice is unlike-
ly to share their views on the outcome of a case.72 This is be-
cause in the absence of a substitute, a recusal cannot cause a 
majority decision that runs counter to the recused Justice’s 
views. If that Justice would have provided the decisive vote, the 
remaining Justices would split evenly and create no Supreme 
Court precedent.73 Since the Justices themselves decide wheth-
er to recuse, a decision that is unreviewable, skewing that deci-
sion could undermine the integrity and appearance of integrity 
of the Court by causing Justices to participate in cases in which 
they have an identifiable interest.74 McElroy and Dorf also raise 
concerns about the constitutionality of authorizing substitute 
Justices, although they conclude that it would likely survive 
constitutional muster.75 
Finally, Ryan Black and Professor Lee Epstein critique on 
empirical grounds the need for a solution to the perceived prob-
lem of recusals resulting in tie votes.76 Relying on a data set 
containing Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 2003, 
they reveal that the recusal of a Justice leads to an affirmance 
by equal division in only a miniscule number of cases.77 Their 
data set contains 599 occasions where a Justice recused herself, 
although the data set does not contain any circumstances 
where tie votes resulted from anything other than a recusal.78 
The data indicate that on only forty-nine occasions has a 
recusal resulted in an equally divided court.79 Black and Ep-
stein argue that the “problem” with recusals is therefore more 
perceived than real, and they wonder whether “near-heroic” 
steps are necessary to address a circumstance that manifests so 
rarely.80 
 
 71. McElroy & Dorf, supra note 66. 
 72. Id. at 99–100. 
 73. Id. at 100. 
 74. Id. at 99. 
 75. Id. at 104. 
 76. See Black & Epstein, supra note 50, at 80–81. 
 77. Id. at 85. 
 78. Id. at 80. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 85. 
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The analysis of tie votes provided in this Article relies on a 
data set of tie votes different than the one analyzed by Black 
and Epstein. While they focused their analysis on tie votes re-
sulting from discretionary recusals,81 this Article examines tie 
votes generally. It does so based on a data set of 164 cases that 
involved tie votes between 1925, when Congress passed the Ju-
diciary Act of 1925, and the end of October term 2014.82 That 
data set was assembled through a search of Westlaw’s Supreme 
Court database. The search terms used to identify the initial set 
of possible cases resulting in tie votes were “affirmed” /10 
“equally divided.” In a few instances, the Court issued multiple 
orders affirming the same lower court’s decision by an equally 
divided court—with each order resolving different petitions for 
certiorari.83 Where multiple orders arose out of a single lower 
court decision, this was counted as a single case. 
The initial search of that database returned 335 results. 
Each result was examined. Orders affirming by equal division 
and opinions in which one or more issues were affirmed by 
equal division were added to the data set. Additionally, any or-
der identified in an opinion as an instance of affirming by an 
equally divided court was cross-referenced against the data set 
to ensure its inclusion. Any case identified in an opinion as 
having involved a tie vote, but not otherwise captured in the 
search, was added to the data set. Cases were included only if 
the court equally divided on the judgment, not where fractured 
opinions evenly divided as to the reason for a judgment.84 
 
 81. Id. at 80. 
 82. The Judiciary Act of 1925 did not, of course, apply to cases already on 
the Supreme Court’s docket as an appellate matter at the time the Act came 
into effect. None of the 164 cases in my sample consisted of such residual ap-
peals. The Court affirmed by equal division one case in 1927, Chesapeake & 
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Leitch, 275 U.S. 507 (1927) (per curiam), but that case came to 
the Court through the certiorari process. The Court next affirmed by equal di-
vision in the 1930 case Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Morgan, 280 
U.S. 534 (1930) (per curiam). That case did arise under the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction, but under a provision that remained in effect after the Judiciary 
Act of 1925. 
 83. See, e.g., Stemmer v. New York, 336 U.S. 963 (1949) (per curiam); 
Krakower v. New York, 336 U.S. 963 (1949) (per curiam). 
 84. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 750 (1994) (“On the ques-
tion addressed by the other eight Justices, then, the Baldasar [v. Illinois, 446 
U.S. 222 (1980)] Court was in equipoise, leaving a decision in the same posture 
as an affirmance by an equally divided Court . . . .”); Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 
(1987)), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 
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The 164 cases identified using this methodology are an ex-
ceedingly small percentage of the cases decided by the Supreme 
Court (less than one percent), which has decided over 15,000 
cases during that period.85 As the table and chart summarizing 
the data set indicate, the prevalence of tie votes has varied to 
some degree over time. In general, since 1989, there have been 
relatively few tie votes as compared to the prior six decades. 
Table 1: Number of Tie Votes During Five-Year Periods 
Years Ties 
2010–2014 4 
2005–2009 3 
2000–2004 3 
1995–1999 2 
1990–1994 3 
1985–1989 21 
1980–1984 9 
1975–1979 7 
1970–1974 14 
1965–1969 7 
1960–1964 12 
1955–1959 13 
 
(1996) (“Eight Members of the Court addressed the question of whether to 
overrule Hans only two Terms ago—but inconclusively, since they were evenly 
divided.”). These cases present difficult problems of identifying controlling le-
gal rules as discussed in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), and 
its progeny, but are different than circumstances where the court equally di-
vides as to the judgment. See Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-
Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933 (2013). The 
data set did not include motions and orders terminating cases that were re-
solved by an equally divided court. See, e.g., Bell v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 891 
(1987) (denying stay of execution by equally divided court); St. Louis Bd. of 
Educ. v. Caldwell, 429 U.S. 1086 (1977) (denying application to recall and stay 
mandate by equally divided court). 
 85. This data was compiled from the Federal Judicial Center’s data on 
Supreme Court disposition, which reports that there were 15,768 full and per 
curium opinions from 1932 to 2013. See Supreme Court of the United States: 
Method of Disposition, 1970–2014, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_Sup_Ct_Methods_of_Disposition_2 (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016); Supreme Court of the United States: Method of Disposi-
tion, 1932–1969, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/ 
page/caseloads_Sup_Ct_method_of_disposition (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).  
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1950–1954 19 
1945–1949 13 
1940–1944 21 
1935–1939 6 
1930–1934 6 
1925–1929 1 
Total 164 
 
Figure 1: Three-Year Running Average of Tie Votes 
B. DISMISSAL AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 
Like the affirmance by equal division, the DIG has a long 
history. A DIG occurs where the Supreme Court decides that it 
erred in granting certiorari and enters an order dismissing the 
writ of certiorari, thereby terminating the case in the Supreme 
Court.86 Like the affirmance by equal division, the DIG typical-
ly occurs late in a case’s life.87 Also like the affirmance by equal 
division (or a denial of a petition for certiorari) the DIG has no 
precedential value.88 
 
 86. See Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the 
DIG: An Empirical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1421, 1421 
(2005) [hereinafter Solimine & Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG]. 
 87. An affirmance by equal division occurs after all briefing and oral ar-
gument have concluded and in only a few cases has the Court used a DIG prior 
to oral argument. See id. at 1427–28. 
 88. See, e.g., Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 576 (1960) (“It is precisely be-
cause a denial of a petition for certiorari without more has no significance as a 
ruling that an explicit statement of the reason for a denial means what it 
says.”). 
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The Court first used the DIG soon after Congress vested it 
with its certiorari jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals Act of 
1891.89 While it’s unclear precisely which cases were involved, 
during debate over the Judiciary Act of 1925, Justices Willis 
Van Devanter and James McReynolds testified that the Court 
sometimes dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.90 In its 1955 order DIGing the case of Rice v. Sioux 
City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., the Court stated that it had 
used the procedure more than sixty times.91 
The Supreme Court is notoriously opaque with its internal 
procedures and has provided scant public information about the 
DIG. A study conducted by Professors Michael Solimine and 
Rafael Gely provides some illumination of the procedure.92 They 
identified 155 times when the Court DIGed a case between 
1954 and 2005.93 Of those 155 DIGs, only twelve occurred be-
fore oral argument.94 A super-majority vote of six Justices is 
typically, although not always, required to DIG a case.95 This 
super-majority requirement can be viewed as a necessary corol-
lary to the “Rule of Four,” which requires the support of only 
four Justices to grant certiorari.96 The idea is that if four Jus-
tices can grant certiorari, it would make no sense for five Jus-
tices to be able to dismiss the writ.97 This requirement has not, 
however, always been respected. In fourteen of the 155 DIGs 
examined by Solimine and Gely, the Court issued a DIG by a 
 
 89. Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 828. 
 90. See James F. Blumstein, The Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction—Reform 
Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REV. 895, 
924 (1973). 
 91. Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 78 (1955). 
 92. See Solimine & Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG, supra note 86, 
at 1425. 
 93. See id. at 1434. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Solimine & Gely, Sophisticated Use of DIGs, supra note 29, at 158. 
 96. See id. at 158. In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 
521, 560 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in one case and dissenting in three), 
Justice John Harlan expressed support for a rule that only a super-majority 
vote could DIG a case. In explaining his reasons for not supporting dismissal 
in four cases arising in 1957, Justice Harlan explains that while he did not 
support the grant of certiorari, “I cannot reconcile voting to dismiss the writs 
as ‘improvidently granted’ with the Court’s ‘rule of four.’” Id. at 559. Justice 
Harlan’s position on how many votes were required to DIG a case was not con-
sistent across his career. See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 29, at 1091–92. In 
Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497, 497 (1971) (per 
curiam), Justice Harlan defended a five-Justice simple majority DIGing a case. 
 97. See Solimine & Gely, Sophisticated Use of DIGs, supra note 29, at 158. 
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vote of five to four.98 The Court also generally relies on the DIG 
only where it can entirely dismiss a case. In fifteen instances, 
however, the Court used the DIG to dispose of only a portion of 
a case for which certiorari had been granted.99 
The Supreme Court has invoked numerous reasons for us-
ing a DIG. The most influential treatise on Supreme Court 
practice examines the reasons that the Court issues a DIG, not-
ing that the explanations that the Court sometimes provides 
“emphasize that the ‘certworthiness’ of a case must be evident 
to the Court not only at the initial screening stage but in all 
subsequent phases of a proceeding.”100 After canvassing the cas-
es, the treatise identifies at least seventeen reasons that the 
Court may DIG a case, including “[a]n apparent conflict of deci-
sions may disappear upon closer analysis,” “[a]n important is-
sue may be found not to be presented by the record,” and “[a] 
hitherto unsuspected jurisdictional defect may become appar-
ent.”101 All seventeen reasons generally amount to a recognition 
by the Court of some changed circumstance, even if the 
changed circumstance relates simply to the Court’s under-
standing of the case.102 
II.  SOURCES OF JURISDICTION AND THE EQUALLY 
DIVIDED COURT   
This Article’s proposal—that the Supreme Court DIG ra-
ther than affirm by an equally divided court—can only occur for 
those cases that arrive at the Supreme Court on a writ of certi-
orari. Where a case arises under the Court’s mandatory appel-
late jurisdiction, the Court cannot DIG because there is no writ 
of certiorari to dismiss. The few cases that arise under the 
Court’s original jurisdiction pose an even thornier problem be-
cause the Court can neither DIG—because again there is no 
writ of certiorari to dismiss—nor affirm by an equally divided 
 
 98. Id. at 167. 
 99. Solimine & Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG, supra note 86, at 
1434. 
 100. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 360 (10th ed. 
2013). The Shapiro treatise, formerly known as Stern and Gressman, deserves 
particular attention because in interviews, Supreme Court Justices refer “fre-
quently” to it “and in a way that almost seemed as if it were an official publi-
cation of the Court.” See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SET-
TING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 23 (1991). 
 101. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 100, at 360–62. 
 102. Solimine & Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG, supra note 86, at 
1450. 
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court—because there is no lower court decision to affirm.103 
While mandatory appeals and original jurisdiction cases occur, 
as this Part will explain, very few have resulted in tie votes. As 
a result, in the lion’s share of cases, the DIG is an available op-
tion to the Court when the Justices divide evenly. 
A. SHIFTS IN JURISDICTION 
Prior to 1925, the Court’s docket was dominated by cases 
over which it had mandatory jurisdiction, most frequently cases 
where parties could exercise an appeal as of right.104 The rule 
that an equally divided court affirms the lower court decision 
without creating binding precedent grew out of that historical 
era and resolved an obvious problem confronting the Court. 
Where the Supreme Court has mandatory jurisdiction, it must 
somehow resolve the case before it. The Court developed a few 
rules that enabled it to affirmatively decline to exercise juris-
diction over cases that otherwise fell within its mandatory ju-
risdiction, such as the rule that the Court may dismiss an ap-
peal for want of a substantial federal question.105 Such a 
dismissal, however, is predicated on a determination about the 
substance of the case coming before the Court, and did not pro-
vide the Justices with broad discretion to decline to hear cases 
where they divided on the appropriate outcome. 
The shift to a discretionary docket relying on the petition 
for certiorari as the primary vehicle by which cases arise in the 
Supreme Court began in earnest with the Judiciary Act of 
1925,106 and today the vast majority of cases come to the Su-
preme Court upon a writ of certiorari.107 Only a few cases arise 
under the Court’s original jurisdiction, which generally involve 
suits between states over territorial disputes and rarely consti-
tute “cases of more than passing interest.”108 Congress has also 
 
 103. See Michael Coenen, Comment, Original Jurisdiction Deadlocks, 118 
YALE L.J. 1003, 1003–04 (2009). 
 104. See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 1 (1980). 
 105. See PERRY, supra note 100. 
 106. See PROVINE, supra note 104. 
 107. See The Statistics, 126 HARV. L. REV. 388, 395 (2012); Boskey & 
Gressman, supra note 30, at 89–90; see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions 
Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2013) (providing a 
history on the expansion of the Supreme Court’s discretionary appellate juris-
diction). 
 108. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdic-
tion in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 557 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. 
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largely done away with the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, leaving only a few statutory provisions un-
der which a party has a right to an appeal in the Supreme 
Court following a trial overseen by a three-judge district 
court.109 
B. INSIGNIFICANCE OF MANDATORY JURISDICTION IN TIE VOTES 
The Court could not use a DIG to dispose of a case that 
falls within the Court’s limited remaining mandatory jurisdic-
tion. This Section assesses the extent to which such cases re-
sult in tie votes based on the data set of 164 ties that arose be-
tween 1925 and 2014 and finds that the number of ties that 
would arise under the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction today—
exactly one—is a miniscule number. 
Of the cases in the data set, thirty-three arose under a 
statute that at the time of the case provided the Court with 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction (twenty percent) and 122 
arose under a statute that at the time of the case provided the 
Court with discretionary certiorari jurisdiction (eighty percent). 
No cases in the data set arose under the Court’s original juris-
diction—although, as will be discussed below,110 one tie vote oc-
curred regarding an issue within the Court’s original jurisdic-
tion, but that order was not captured in the data set because 
the Court did not state that the Justices had evenly divided 
and no subsequent decision referred to the order as involving 
an equally divided court.111 I then examined the thirty-three 
cases that arose as an appeal to determine if that case would 
still be treated as an appeal under the current law governing 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.112 
Analysis of the thirty-three tie votes that arose under the 
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction reveals that all but one of these 
cases would be treated as petitions for certiorari today.113 That 
 
§ 1251(a) (2012) (providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court 
over “all controversies between two or more states”). 
 109. See The Statistics, supra note 107; Boskey & Gressman, supra note 30, 
at 89–90; see also Grove, supra note 107. 
 110. See infra notes 146–54 and accompanying text. 
 111. See In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953). 
 112. This analysis was conducted in two ways: first, by examining the stat-
utory provision cited by the Court as the basis for jurisdiction and determining 
whether that provision had been amended to eliminate mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction, and, second, by referring to scholarly discussion of the Court’s 
shifting jurisdiction. See, e.g., Boskey & Gressman, supra note 30, at 89–90. 
 113. The one case is Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (per 
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means that less than one percent of affirmances by equal divi-
sion that occurred between 1925 and 2015 would fall within the 
Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction today. 
Ten of the cases that arose as appeals were appeals from 
state supreme court decisions.114 Such appeals were authorized 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and its predecessors, in circumstances 
where a state supreme court either upheld a state statute 
against a challenge alleging that it was invalid as a matter of 
federal law or invalidated a federal statute or treaty.115 The 
cases in this category are dispersed throughout the period ex-
amined. Two orders affirming by equal division were issued in 
the 1930s, two orders were issued in the 1940s, two orders were 
issued in the 1960s, three orders were issued in the 1970s, and 
one order was issued in 1991.116 Congress removed this aspect 
of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction in the 1988 Su-
preme Court Case Selection Act.117 Today, all ten cases would 
arise only on writs of certiorari. 
Four cases arose as appeals from decisions by federal 
courts of appeals.118 Prior to the Supreme Court Case Selection 
Act,119 the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over decisions 
by federal courts of appeals that either held a state statute in-
valid as contrary to federal law or held a federal statute uncon-
 
curiam); see also Probable Jurisdiction Noted, Common Cause v. Schmitt, 450 
U.S. 908 (1981). 
 114. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 500 U.S. 172 (1991) (per 
curiam); Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971) (per curiam); Grove Press 
Inc. v. Md. State Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971) (per curiam); In re Spen-
cer, 397 U.S. 817 (1970) (per curiam); Slagle v. Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961) (per 
curiam); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam); Double-
day & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (per curiam); N.Y., Chi. & St. Lou-
is R.R. Co. v. Frank, 313 U.S. 538 (1941) (per curiam); W.H.H. Chamberlin, 
Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936) (per curiam); Nashville, Chattanooga & 
St. Louis Ry. v. Morgan, 280 U.S. 534 (1930) (per curiam). 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1)–(3) (1982) (authorizing the Court to assert certio-
rari jurisdiction in other circumstances, including where state or federal law 
was held constitutional). 
 116. That 1991 case is Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 500 U.S. 
172 (1991) (per curiam). See Brief for Appellant, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 500 U.S. 172 (1991) (No. 88-1847), 1990 W.L. 10022479. 
 117. Pub. L. 100-352 (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988). 
 118. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (per curiam); Pension Ben. 
Guar. Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 481 U.S. 735 (1987) (per curiam); Cory 
v. W. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (per curiam); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. 
City v. Nat’l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per curiam). 
 119. Pub. L. 100-352 (1988). 
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stitutional so long as the federal government was a party.120 
Two cases arose under each of those provisions. The Supreme 
Court issued all four orders affirming by equal division during 
the 1980s. Each of those cases would arise under the certiorari 
jurisdiction today. 
One case, resolved in 1957, involved a district court deci-
sion in a criminal case.121 The United States sought to prosecute 
a partnership that allegedly knew it violated regulations ad-
dressing the safe transportation of explosives.122 The district 
court dismissed the information, ruling that partnerships were 
not subject to criminal liability under the regulations.123 The 
United States appealed under a provision vesting the Supreme 
Court with appellate jurisdiction over certain appeals by the 
United States in criminal cases.124 Congress eliminated this as-
pect of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 1971 and a 
case such as this one would now arise under the Court’s certio-
rari jurisdiction.125 
The remaining eighteen appeals arose out of federal dis-
trict court panels in circumstances in which Congress author-
ized a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The largest number, 
nine in total, dealt with cases brought under the Sherman An-
titrust Act.126 Under the 1903 Expediting Act, appeal from such 
decision lay exclusively in the Supreme Court.127 Congress 
amended the Expediting Act in 1974, removing most of the Su-
preme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in this context.128 Even in 
 
 120. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254(2) (1987). 
 121. See United States v. Am. Freightways Co., 352 U.S. 1020 (1957) (per 
curiam); Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, United States v. Am. Freightways 
Co., 352 U.S. 1020 (1957) (No. 265), 1956 WL 89193 (Statement as to Jurisdic-
tion). 
 122. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *2, United States v. Am. Freight-
ways Co., 352 U.S. 1020 (1957) (No. 265), 1956 WL 89193 (Statement as to Ju-
risdiction). 
 123. Id. at *1. 
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970). 
 125. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). 
 126. United States v. First Nat’l Bancorporation, Inc., 410 U.S. 577 (1973) 
(per curiam); United States v. Pennolin Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967) (per curiam); 
United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965) (per curiam); Holophane 
Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam); United States v. Cotton 
Valley Operators Comm., 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam); United States v. 
Pullman Co., 330 U.S. 806 (1947); Otis & Co. v. United States, 330 U.S. 806 
(1947); Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 330 U.S. 806 (1947); 
Glore, Forgan & Co. v. United States, 330 U.S. 806 (1947) (per curiam). 
 127. The Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1903), 32 Stat. 823 (1903). 
 128. Pub. L. 93-528 (1974); see also Boskey & Gressman, supra note 30, at 
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those cases that still fall under the direct review provisions of 
that Act, the Supreme Court has discretion as to whether to ac-
cept the appeal,129 and no appeal to the Supreme Court under 
the Sherman Act has resulted in equal division since 1973.130 
The Sherman Act cases are well distributed across time. One 
case occurred in the 1970s, two in the 1960s, two in the 1950s, 
and four in the 1940s. 
Three more of the appeals involved cases in which a three-
judge district court panel enjoined enforcement of federal or 
state law as contrary to the Constitution.131 One of these orders 
was issued in the 1950s, one in the 1940s, and one in the 
1930s.132 Congress eliminated this aspect of the Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction in 1976.133 Another three of the appeals in-
volved cases where an injunction was sought against an order 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission.134 Two of these orders 
were issued in the 1970s and one in the 1960s.135 Congress 
eliminated this aspect of the Supreme Court’s appellate juris-
diction in 1975136 and abolished the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1995.137 And finally, two of the appeals, both re-
solved in 1952, involved a suit seeking to enjoin orders of the 
United States Maritime Commission.138 These appeals were re-
solved shortly before the Commission was abolished.139 
 
89–90. 
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (2012). 
 130. The Supreme Court has not heard a case on direct review under the 
Expediting Act since the 1983 case Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 
(1983), and that case resulted in a summary affirmance without opinion. 
 131. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1970), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, 90 
Stat. 1119 (1976); Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950) (per curiam); Reitz v. 
Mealey, 313 U.S. 542 (per curiam), reh’g granted, Reitz v. Mealey, 313 U.S. 
597 (1941); R.R. Comm’n of Cal. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 301 U.S. 669 (1937) 
(per curiam). 
 132. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 133. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 
 134. Ala. Power Co. v. United States, 400 U.S. 73 (1970) (per curiam); At-
lanta City Elec. Co. v. United States, 400 U.S. 73 (1970) (per curiam); Balt. & 
Ohio R.R. Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 373 U.S. 372 (1963) (per curiam). 
 135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 136. Pub. L. No. 93-584 (1975); see also Boskey & Gressman, supra note 30, 
at 89–90. 
 137. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-88 (1995). 
 138. Fed. Mar. Bd. v. United States, 342 U.S. 950 (1952) (per curiam); A/S 
J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952) (per 
curiam). 
 139. See Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 173, 176 (1950), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. app. § 306 at 114 (2000). 
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This leaves just one appeal affirmed by an equally divided 
court during this time period that would today arise under the 
Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction. In 1980, the 
Supreme Court affirmed by equal division a three-judge district 
court decision involving public funding during the presidential 
election of 1980.140 The Federal Elections Commission and a 
public interest group sued supporters of then-candidate Ronald 
Reagan seeking to enjoin certain expenditures proposed by 
those supporters as contrary to the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Act.141 A three-judge district court held that the Act 
did not bar the expenditures142 and the Federal Election Com-
mission took a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court under 
28 U.S.C. § 1253, which authorizes direct appeals from deci-
sions of three-judge district courts.143 The Supreme Court af-
firmed by equal division.144 Challenges involving the Presiden-
tial Election Campaign Act remain among the few types of 
claims that are still adjudicated by a three-judge district court 
panel, and the Supreme Court retains mandatory appellate ju-
risdiction over these decisions.145 
As mentioned above, the literature discussing the affir-
mance by equal division identifies one example between 1925 
and 2015 as involving a tie vote in a matter arising under the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The case In re Isserman 
was not captured in my data set because the Court did not 
acknowledge the tie vote in its opinion.146 Tie votes in original 
jurisdiction matters prove difficult because there is no lower 
court decision that can be affirmed. Instead, a matter presents 
itself to the Supreme Court in the first instance. In re Isserman 
involved a proceeding of disbarment.147 Abraham Isserman was 
 
 140. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 141. Id. at 490. 
 142. Id. at 503. 
 143. Probable Jurisdiction Noted, Common Cause v. Schmitt, 450 U.S. 908 
(1981) (No. 80-847). 
 144. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (per curiam). 
 145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012); Boskey & Gressman, supra note 30, at 97. 
 146. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953); see also Hartnett, supra note 62, 
at 657–58. In 1870, the Supreme Court also faced a tie vote in a matter arising 
under its original jurisdiction in a boundary dispute case. Coenen, supra note 
103, at 1004 (citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39 (1870)). 
While the Court has not developed a clear rule to govern such situations, the 
logic it has applied to tie votes in other contexts—that the Court lacks power 
to act in the absence of a majority vote—would suggest that the state filing the 
original action would by necessity lose. See Hartnett, supra note 62, at 657–58. 
 147. 345 U.S. 286 (1953). 
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convicted of contempt for his conduct as an attorney represent-
ing defendants accused of conspiring to organize the communist 
party in the United States.148 As a result of the contempt con-
viction, the Supreme Court of New Jersey disbarred 
Isserman,149 and the Court of Appeals of New York suspended 
his bar license for two years.150 Pursuant to its rules at the 
time, the Supreme Court issued Isserman an order to show 
cause as to why he should not be disbarred.151 The Justices di-
vided four to four and Chief Justice Fred Vinson explained, 
“Our rule puts the burden upon respondent to show good cause 
why he should not be disbarred.”152 Because Isserman did not 
receive the support of a majority of the Justices, the Court is-
sued an order disbarring him.153 Apparently troubled by this 
outcome, the Court then modified its rules, requiring a majority 
vote to disbar an attorney, and granted Isserman’s petition for 
rehearing, reinstating his license.154 
In re Isserman, and potential ties in other original jurisdic-
tion cases, pose a difficult problem for the Court because, un-
like cases arising either under the Court’s limited mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction or under its certiorari jurisdiction, no 
lower court ruling can resolve the matter. As a result, the 
Court can neither affirm by equal division nor DIG. The logic of 
the Court’s jurisprudence on the effect of tie votes—which sug-
gests that the Court lacks power to issue affirmative orders in 
the absence of a majority vote—would suggest that the party 
bringing a matter within the original jurisdiction would neces-
sarily lose.155 
III.  TYPOLOGY OF THE EQUALLY DIVIDED COURTS   
Using the empirical data set discussed in Part II, this Part 
develops a typology of affirmances by equal division. The most 
common form of these dispositions is also the least trouble-
 
 148. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (underlying criminal 
case); United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950) (contempt proceed-
ing).  
 149. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. at 289–90. 
 150. Id. at 289. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 290. 
 154. In re Isserman, 348 U.S. 1 (1954) (per curiam). 
 155. But see Coenen, supra note 103, at 1005–07 (identifying strategies for 
addressing tie votes in original jurisdiction matters). 
  
270 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 101:245 
 
some. As will be discussed, the Supreme Court usually issues 
an order affirming the lower court decision without discussion 
and absent any identification of which Justices voted which 
way. But this is not always the case. 
A. AFFIRMANCE WITHOUT EXPLANATION OR IDENTIFICATION 
The most common form of the affirmance by equal division 
is both unattributed and non-explanatory, with the order indi-
cating only the Justice recused. Of course, if the Supreme Court 
is experiencing a vacancy, and this is the cause of the equal di-
vision, no such comment is made. This is the form of 140 of the 
164 cases in the data set. 
Flores-Villar v. United States is a good example. In that 
case, the Court’s order reads in its entirety: “PER CURIAM. 
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice 
KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this 
case.”156 
B. AFFIRMANCE AS PART OF A LARGER OPINION 
In fourteen cases, the Supreme Court notes its affirmance 
by equal division as part of a larger opinion resolving the mer-
its of a case.157 In some of these cases, the Supreme Court re-
veals more about the views of the Justices on the issue not de-
cided, than in cases where the entire case is resolved by an 
equally divided court.158 
A good example is Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.159 The case 
involved a $4.5 billion punitive damage award against Exxon 
 
 156. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011) (per 
curiam). Justice Elena Kagan recused herself because her office dealt with the 
case when she was the solicitor general. See Stephen Kanter, Brevity Is the 
Soul of Wit: Nguyen Is Dead, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1305, 1314 (2012). 
 157. Credit Suisse Securities (U.S.A.), L.L.C. v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 
(2012); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 
554 (1989); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 
(1988) (per curiam); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Slagle v. 
Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961); Int’l Typographical Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705 
(1961); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lewis v. Benedict 
Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); Holophane 
Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (summarily affirming in part and 
affirming by an equally divided court) (per curiam); Douglas v. Comm’r, 322 
U.S. 275 (1944). 
 158. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535; Exxon Shipping Co., 554 
U.S. at 482–84. 
 159. 554 U.S. 471. 
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related to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska.160 The Court 
considered three issues: (1) could Exxon be liable for punitive 
damages for the reckless conduct of managers within its em-
ploy; (2) did the Clean Water Act’s provision of civil penalties 
preempt common law punitive damages; and (3) did maritime 
law limit punitive damages to the amount awarded as compen-
satory damages.161 The Court divided evenly on the first ques-
tion.162 
The Exxon decision is also notable because the opinion in-
cludes a detailed discussion of the competing legal theories re-
lated to question of vicarious liability—the question upon which 
the Court evenly divided.163 It provides a detailed examination 
of two nineteenth century cases that support the proposition 
that punitive damages were unavailable, and then examines 
principles contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that 
suggested an alternative outcome.164 Only then does the Court 
announce that it is evenly divided.165 While the opinion makes 
no reference to the views of any particular Justice, the discus-
sion of the opposing legal principles at stake provides signifi-
cant information about how the opposing Justices viewed the 
issue.166 
The Court is, at times, however, explicit about the views of 
particular Justices. In Raley v. Ohio, the Court considered four 
contempt convictions arising out of Ohio’s commission on “Un-
American Activities.”167 The defendants had been summoned 
before the Commission to answer questions about their in-
volvement with the communist party, and all four had objected 
to the questions by invoking the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
against self-incrimination.168 They were then convicted for con-
tempt because, so the state court found, a state statute provid-
ed them with immunity for answers given to the Commission.169 
 
 160. In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), 
rev’d in part by, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 161. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 475–76. 
 162. Id. at 476. 
 163. Id. at 482–84. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 484. 
 166. Id. at 482–84. 
 167. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 424 (1959). 
 168. Id. at 424. 
 169. Id. at 424–26. 
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The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of three of the 
defendants because the Commission had not explicitly over-
ruled their objections.170 The Court then affirmed the conviction 
of the fourth defendant by a tie vote.171 The majority opinion, 
authored by Justice William Brennan, addresses the issue, say-
ing “[t]o four of us, the matter is plain” that the prosecution of 
the fourth defendant violated the due process clause.172 The 
Opinion provides a full analysis of the legal issue presented 
and the views of Justice Brennan and the three Justices that 
joined that portion of his opinion.173 Justice Tom Clark, joined 
by Justices Felix Frankfurter, John Harlan, and Charles Whit-
taker, writes separately to express the view that the conviction 
should be sustained.174 Justice Clark’s opinion specifically ad-
dresses the issue that divided the Court and explains his view 
that the state supreme court decision should be affirmed with 
respect to the fourth defendant.175 
Moreover, affirmance by equal division can sometimes re-
solve necessary threshold issues. While in eight of the cases in 
this category, the Court affirms by equal division with respect 
to an issue independent of the others in the case, in one case 
the procedure is used to affirm a lower court’s resolution of a 
jurisdictional issue. In American Electric Power Co. v. Connect-
icut,176 the Court considered suits brought by states and private 
parties against large power utilities, including those owned by 
a federal agency, alleging that the utilities’ emissions of carbon 
dioxide constituted a public nuisance under federal common 
law.177 The district court dismissed the complaint invoking the 
political question doctrine.178 The Second Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that the political question doctrine did not bar the suit and 
further deciding that the state and private plaintiffs had stand-
ing, that the federal common law of public nuisance applied, 
 
 170. Id. at 437–39. 
 171. Id. at 442. 
 172. Id. at 440–42. 
 173. Id. The majority opinion ends by expressing the majority’s “regret that 
our Brethren remain unpersuaded on this score.” Id. at 442. 
 174. Id. at 442–45 (Clark, J., writing separately). 
 175. Id. at 445 (“We would therefore affirm as to Stern.”). 
 176. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 177. Id. at 2532. 
 178. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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and that the Clean Air Act did not displace federal common 
law.179 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that 
any federal common law claim had been displaced by the Clean 
Air Act.180 To reach that question, however, the Court needed to 
first decide whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit, 
and thus, whether the Court had the constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.181 Rather than resolving that issue for it-
self, the Court announced that it was evenly divided, and that 
therefore it affirmed the lower court’s opinion that jurisdiction 
existed.182 Thus, affirmance by equal division in this case oper-
ated to allow a precedential decision on the merits that other-
wise would not have been possible. 
Moreover, like the decision in Raley, the American Electric 
Power decision also discloses how the Justices voted on the 
question upon which the Court divided: “Four members of the 
Court,” we are told, “would hold that at least some plaintiffs 
have Article III standing . . . .”183 The other four, “adhering to a 
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts [v. EPA], or regarding that 
decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of the plain-
tiffs have Article III standing.”184 Discerning how the votes 
broke down on the jurisdictional question is, then, simply a 
matter of a moment’s legal research to identify those Justices 
that dissented in Massachusetts v. EPA.185 
The cases discussed here indicate that in the subset of tie 
votes that occur in multi-issue cases, the Justices appear more 
 
 179. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 180. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2537–40. 
 181. Id. at 420; see also Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & 
Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008) (reiterating the Supreme Court’s obliga-
tion to determine jurisdiction before deciding other issues); Pidot, Jurisdic-
tional Procedure, supra note 26, at 30–36 (discussing how jurisdictional proce-
dure serves as a self-imposed limit of the judiciary’s constitutional power); 
Justin Pidot, The Invisibility of Jurisdictional Procedure and Its Consequenc-
es, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1405 (2012) [hereinafter Pidot, Invisibility]. 
 182. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (citation omitted). 
 185. In Douglas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court also tips 
the hands of some of the Justices, reporting that the “members of this Court 
who join in the dissent do not reach” the question upon which the Court evenly 
divided “but their position on other issues results in their voting for a reversal 
of the entire judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Two other members of 
this Court are of the view that . . . the judgment of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals should be reversed” on the particular issue. 322 U.S. 275, 287 (1944). 
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apt to elaborate on the issue that divided the Court. This elabo-
ration may reveal the preferences of individual Justices, but 
even where it does not, the Court provides significant guidance 
about the manner in which different Justices viewed the con-
tested issue. 
C. SEPARATE OPINIONS RELATED TO AFFIRMANCE 
In three cases that involve only the resolution of a single 
issue by an equally divided Court, one or more Justices join a 
dissent revealing their views about an issue that divided the 
Court. While these cases are rare, they illustrate that the cur-
rent approach to tie votes can lead Justices to disclose their 
views about unresolved issues. 
In Standard Industries, Inc. v. Tigrett Industries,186 the 
Court considered a case in which a patent holder sued a patent 
licensee for damages.187 The lower court found for the plain-
tiff,188 and the Supreme Court affirmed by equal division.189 Jus-
tice Hugo Black, joined by Justice William Douglas, dissented, 
explaining that the Court should have considered the validity 
of the patent because the Court had decided another case after 
the lower court’s decision that should have been viewed as con-
trolling.190 
Similarly, in Biggers v. Tennessee,191 the Court considered a 
criminal defendant’s constitutional challenge to the procedure 
that the police used to secure eyewitness identification.192 The 
Court affirmed by equal division,193 but Justice William Doug-
las wrote a four-page dissent explaining his view that the iden-
tification was unconstitutional and that the conviction should 
have been reversed.194 
Finally, in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,195 the Court affirmed 
by equal division the denial of a habeas petition.196 Justice Wil-
 
 186. 397 U.S. 586 (1970) (per curiam). 
 187. Id. at 586 (Black J., dissenting). 
 188. Tigrett Indus., Inc. v. Standard Indus., Inc., 411 F.2d 1218, 1220 (6th 
Cir. 1969). 
 189. Standard Indus., 397 U.S. at 586. 
 190. Id. at 587–88 (Black, J. dissenting). 
 191. 390 U.S. 404 (1968) (per curiam). 
 192. See Biggers v. State, 411 S.W.2d 696, 696–97 (Tenn. 1967). 
 193. Biggers, 390 U.S. at 404. 
 194. Id. at 404–09 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 195. 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam). 
 196. Id. at 263; see also State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 151 N.E. 523 (Ohio 
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liam Brennan, joined by three other Justices, dissented, ex-
pressing the view that the convicted individual’s dwelling had 
been unconstitutionally searched.197 The dissent, which runs 
twelve pages, notes that where there is a tie vote, “the usual 
practice is not to express any opinion, for such an expression is 
unnecessary where nothing is settled.”198 Justice Brennan justi-
fies his departure from this practice because “even before the 
cause was argued, four Justices made public record of their 
votes to affirm the judgment,” and, therefore, how the Justices 
voted was a matter of public record.199 
In each of these cases, the vote of one or more of the Justic-
es is made plain, despite the Court’s affirmance by an equally 
divided court. Indeed, more than just the vote, but the reason-
ing and underlying rationales are laid out in striking detail. 
D. MISCELLANEOUS 
The Supreme Court has affirmed by equal division in a few 
other circumstances that fit none of the categories identified. In 
California v. Pinkus, for example, the Court appears to have 
granted a petition for certiorari and affirmed by an equally di-
vided court all in the same order and absent briefing on the 
merits or oral argument.200 The practice of granting a petition 
for certiorari based on a vote of four Justices makes this result 
possible, but it seems strange that the Court would undertake 
such action, particularly because it suggests that the factions of 
Justices in the case were so entrenched that the case’s resolu-
tion was foreordained.201 In Kissinger v. Halperin, the Court is-
sued an order DIGing the case with respect to one of the peti-
tioners and affirming by equal division with respect to three 
others.202 In Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, the Court grants, 
vacates, and remands the case with respect to two petitioners 
 
1958). 
 197. Ohio ex rel. Eaton, 364 U.S. at 263–76 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 198. Id. at 264. 
 199. Id. The views of the Justices voting to affirm dismissal of the habeas 
petition had been expressed in opinions related to the Court noting probable 
jurisdiction in the case. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton, 360 U.S. 246 (1959) (per 
curiam). 
 200. Pinkus v. Pitchess, 429 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub 
nom., California v. Pinkus, 400 U.S. 922 (Nov. 23, 1970) (No. 503). 
 201. That the Ninth Circuit’s decision below is a terse per curiam decision 
makes this odder still. See Pinkus, 429 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 202. 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (per curiam). 
  
276 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 101:245 
 
and affirms by equal division with respect to four petitioners.203 
Finally, in two cases, one Justice votes to DIG the case and 
thereafter declines to participate in adjudicating the merits.204 
The remaining Justices split evenly and thereby affirm by an 
equally divided court. 
IV.  THE EPHEMERAL IMPORTANCE OF THE EQUALLY 
DIVIDED COURT   
As this Article has detailed, the Supreme Court has af-
firmed by equal division relatively rarely, and in a variety of 
manners. This Part turns to the question of whether these cas-
es are odd curiosities or significant problems. If they are signif-
icant problems, then perhaps Congress should devise a system 
by which a substitute Justice can break ties. This Part begins 
by examining the cost of such a procedure, in particular, ex-
plaining the manner by which appointment of a substitute Jus-
tice could undermine the long-term stability of federal law. 
This Part then continues by examining twenty-five years of tie 
votes to explain that, perhaps counterintuitively, affirmances 
by equally divided Courts have little lasting importance in 
terms of uniformity among the lower courts. As a result, nei-
ther Congress nor the Court should devise a means of creating 
precedential decisions in circumstances where the Justices 
deadlock. 
A. STABILITY AND UNIFORMITY 
A primary concern expressed with tie votes is that they 
may perpetuate a lack of uniformity among the lower courts. 
Where the lower courts are divided, definitive resolution by the 
Supreme Court advances values of doctrinal uniformity and 
avoids forum shopping and its attendant inefficiency and un-
fairness.205 In the words of then Justice William Rehnquist, fail-
ing to resolve such a split would “lay down ‘one rule in Athens, 
and another rule in Rome’ with a vengeance.”206 Or, as Justice 
 
 203. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam). 
 204. United States v. Jordan, 342 U.S. 911 (1952) (per curiam); Parker v. 
Illinois, 334 U.S. 816 (1948) (per curiam). 
 205. See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 
1684 (1990). But see Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333 
(2006) (arguing that forum shopping is wrongly criticized as unfair when it is 
actually a lawful, authorized strategy). 
 206. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, 
J.). 
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Louis Brandeis explained, “It is usually more important that a 
rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right.”207 
A high percentage of the Supreme Court’s docket involves 
legal issues about which the lower courts are divided.208 As pre-
viously discussed, scholars, lawmakers, and even Justices have 
expressed concern that tie votes lead to a lack of legal uniformi-
ty, and therefore, a system should be developed to allow for a 
substitute Justice.209 However, such a system should only be 
created if the benefits obtained by appointing a substitute Jus-
tice would outweigh the costs. Others have detailed the strate-
gic problems presented by any system for appointing a substi-
tute Justice, both in terms of the behavior of Justices and 
litigants before the Supreme Court.210 I will not repeat the well-
stated concerns about strategic behavior here, but suffice it to 
say that Professors Lisa McElroy and Michael Dorf have 
demonstrated that they are legion.211 
In addition, appointing a substitute Justice would under-
mine the stability of federal law over time. That is because a 
recused Justice may disagree with the views of her replacement 
and, if that alternate view is held with sufficient intensity, she 
may join a majority of the Court to vote to reverse the decision 
in a subsequent case. On the other hand, in those circumstanc-
es where a case before the Supreme Court involves no disa-
greement amongst the lower court, appointing a tie-breaking 
Justice would threaten doctrinal stability while advancing no 
countervailing uniformity value. 
To make this trade-off concrete, consider two cases that 
were affirmed by equal division. In Free v. Abbott Laborato-
ries,212 four circuits had weighed in on the civil procedure issue 
presented. The Third Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Seventh Cir-
cuit had adopted one legal rule213 and the Tenth Circuit anoth-
 
 207. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). 
 208. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 
1569, 1632 (2008) (citing to research conducted by Professor David Straus that 
found an average of seventy percent of certiorari grants from 2004–2006 in-
volved questions over which lower courts differed). 
 209. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 210. See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 66, at 99–101. 
 211. See id. 
 212. 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam). 
 213. Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996); 
In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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er. Had a substitute Justice been appointed, the Supreme 
Court would have eliminated this split in authority, furthering 
the value of uniformity. If the recused Justice disagreed with 
that decision, doctrinal stability would be reduced because the 
Court might reverse itself in short order, but nonetheless, the 
same rule would be applied across the legal system. The same 
is not true for Wyoming v. United States.214 That case involved a 
1908 doctrine governing water adjudications that had been ap-
plied uniformly by the lower courts for decades.215 A decision by 
the Court reversing the lower court’s application of that long-
standing legal rule would have provided no benefit in terms of 
uniformity, and again, stability values would have been un-
dermined. 
The Supreme Court, then, enhances long-term legal stabil-
ity by declining to resolve a legal issue upon which the Justice 
evenly split. At times, this enhanced legal stability may come 
at the expense of uniformity among the circuit courts. Courts 
may already overvalue uniformity,216 and in any case, increas-
ing uniformity in the short-term may not be worth the cost of 
creating long-term instability. 
B. SHORT-TERM IMPACT 
How often do tie votes result in a persistent lack of uni-
formity among lower courts? As the data provided in Part II 
demonstrates, tie votes have been rare circumstances, averag-
ing fewer than two occurrences per year. It is possible, howev-
er, that a significant number of high-profile cases could result 
in tie votes during October Term 2015, due to the death of Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia. The Supreme Court may avoid such a cir-
cumstance, however. Despite concern that the confirmation of 
Justice Elena Kagan to the Court could result in a glut of tie 
votes—she recused herself in roughly one third of the Court’s 
docket during October Term 2010 due to her prior service as 
 
 214. 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (per curiam). 
 215. In re Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 101 
(Wyo. 1988); see also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The 
New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 
1639–41 (1996) (discussing the factual details of Wyoming v. United States and 
the controlling doctrine created by Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908)). 
 216. See Frost, supra note 208, at 1579–1604 (arguing that eradicating 
nonuniformity is often given too much priority to the detriment of other val-
ues). 
  
2016] TIE VOTES IN THE SUPREME COURT 279 
 
the Solicitor General of the United States—on only two occa-
sions did her recusal lead to a tie.217 
The historic rarity of tie votes does not itself definitively 
demonstrate that they are unimportant. As Professors McElroy 
and Dorf suggest, “[I]t could be argued that even one 4-4 split 
can be harmful” because it involves the Court failing to resolve 
a case involving issues of sufficient importance to cause the 
Justices to have granted certiorari.218 They suggest, and I agree, 
however, that issues of such importance will presumably be 
presented to the Court again in short order. Indeed, as Profes-
sor H.W. Perry has noted, “Virtually any issue the Court might 
wish to resolve is offered to it”219 among the thousands of re-
quests for certiorari it receives each year.220 This is likely par-
ticularly true in the types of cases where standardization of the 
law is of particular concern. While the Supreme Court’s criteria 
for granting certiorari may sometimes seem opaque, cases 
where the lower courts are in conflict are clearly at the top of 
the agenda.221 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has, for example, 
explained that about seventy percent of grants of certiorari dur-
ing October Term 1993 involved “splits of authority among ei-
ther federal courts of appeals or state courts of final in-
stance.”222 One might expect that splits of authority also 
dominate the menu of cases from which the Supreme Court 
chooses. 
Persistent divisions among the courts of appeals on ques-
tions of federal law is, of course, one facet of vesting the Su-
preme Court with discretion over its docket, rather than requir-
ing it to decide cases involving splits of authority. At times, the 
Court will choose to overlook cases presenting issues of serious 
concern to the legal profession. How long the Supreme Court 
allows disagreement in the lower courts to fester is a function, 
in part, of the personalities of the Justices themselves and their 
 
 217. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam); 
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2010) (per curiam). 
 218. McElroy & Dorf, supra note 66, at 95. 
 219. PERRY, supra note 100, at 11. 
 220. See, e.g., The Statistics, supra note 107. 
 221. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (listing “a United States court of appeals has en-
tered a decision in conflict with another United States court of appeals” as a 
compelling reason to grant certiorari); SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 100, at 225; 
see also Frost, supra note 208, at 1568–69. 
 222. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address at the 71st Annual American Law In-
stitute Meeting (May 19, 1994), in AM. L. INST. ANN. MEETING SPEECHES 1994 
at 45, 57. 
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view of the relative importance of particular legal issues. Jus-
tice Byron White, for example, held an “unswerving view that 
the Court ought not let circuit splits linger, that it should say 
what the federal law is sooner rather than later.”223 Other Jus-
tices, however, may prefer to let issues “percolate” in the lower 
courts to give the Supreme Court the benefit of lengthy deliber-
ation over an issue.224 
An examination of twenty-five years of cases involving tie 
votes (1986–2010) reveal that these cases have had minimal 
costs in terms of uniformity in the federal courts.225 There are 
twenty-one cases during this period that arose on a petition for 
certiorari.226 These cases fell into three categories. 
First, in sixteen cases, the tie vote had little impact on uni-
formity among the lower courts. That occurred for several rea-
sons. 
In six of these sixteen cases, a tie vote occurred in a context 
where there existed no significant split of authority in the low-
er courts.227 Wyoming v. United States falls into this category. It 
appears that the Supreme Court granted certiorari with the in-
tent of modifying a long-established rule for allocating water 
rights to Indian tribes.228 The papers of Justice Thurgood Mar-
 
 223. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1283, 1285 (2003). 
 224. See Marceau, supra note 84, at 975. 
 225. I selected this twenty-five year time period to provide an adequate 
number of cases to analyze. I did not analyze the three affirmances by an 
equally divided Court that occurred after 2010 because I wanted to ensure 
that the Court had adequate time to return to the issue. 
 226. I am excluding the three cases that arose as appeals because each of 
them would not be treated as appeals today and, thus, they are poor compara-
tors for an analysis of the effect of the Court’s current practice of affirming by 
equal division. 
 227. See Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 493 U.S. 38 
(1989) (per curiam); Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (per 
curiam); California v. United States, 490 U.S. 920 (1989) (per curiam); Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 485 U.S. 175 (1988) 
(per curiam); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 329 (1988) (affirming by equal divi-
sion only the question of the district court’s power to order direct services); 
Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam); see also Brief for Petition-
er, Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (No. 86-728), 1987 W.L. 881257 (failing 
to identify any split of authority with regards to the question of district court 
authority). The TWA case involves what might have been a split over the in-
terpretation of a labor contract with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Interna-
tional Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Reeve Aleutian Airways, 
Inc., 469 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1972). The IAM case has been relied upon by no 
court since the TWA case was decided. 
 228. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (per curiam); see also 
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shall, released upon his death, include a draft opinion written 
by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who eventually recused her-
self, to this effect.229 The tie vote in Wyoming, then, had no con-
sequences in terms of uniformity in the federal courts because 
lower courts simply continued to follow the preexisting rule.230 
Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh 
similarly involved no split in authority on the application of the 
Newspaper Preservation Act, and the Act has been the subject 
of little subsequent litigation.231 The same is true of the issue 
involving the Quiet Title Action presented in California v. 
United States.232 Subsequent to the Court’s affirmance by equal 
division in that case, federal appellate courts have generally 
adopted the approach taken by the lower court.233 So, too, have 
lower courts consistently considered government claims for 
consular nonreviewability following the Court’s affirmance by 
equal division in Reagan v. Abourezk.234 
In one case, a court of appeals reversed its earlier position 
following an affirmance by equal division, eliminating disa-
greement among the lower courts without the need for Su-
preme Court involvement.235 In United States v. Zolin, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement 
between the Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit about the district 
court’s power to place limits on a summons issued by the IRS.236 
In United States v. Jose, the Ninth Circuit overruled its opinion 
 
Getches, supra note 215, at 1640–42. 
 229. Getches, supra note 215, at 1641 n.327. 
 230. See, e.g., Sidney P. Ottem, The General Adjudication of the Yakima 
River: Tributaries for the Twenty-First Century and a Changing Climate, 23 J. 
ENVTL L. & LITIG. 275, 306 (2008). 
 231. Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) 
(per curiam); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mich. Citizens for an 
Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (No. 88-1640), 1989 WL 
1174066. 
 232. California v. United States, 490 U.S. 920 (1989) (per curiam). 
 233. See Shawnee Trail Conservancy v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 222 F.3d 383, 
387 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Although no other court has considered the issue pre-
sented to us in as direct a fashion as the [court of appeals in California v. 
United States], several courts have indicated that the . . . broad reading of the 
exclusivity of the QTA is correct.”). 
 234. Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam); see also Am. 
Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 235. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). 
 236. See id. at 557. Compare United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1416 
(9th Cir. 1987), with United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341, 1350 (5th Cir. 
1988) (per curiam). 
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in United States v. Zolin, bringing itself into alignment with 
the Fifth Circuit and eliminating the split authority.237 
In nine cases, the legal issue presented in a case where the 
Court affirmed by equal division was definitively resolved in a 
subsequent Supreme Court case, eliminating the split of au-
thority.238 In Free v. Abbott Laboratories,239 for example, the 
Court had numerous opportunities to consider the issue at 
stake, which involved the ability of class action plaintiffs to ag-
gregate their claims to meet the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.240 In the 
months that immediately followed the Court’s decision (or non-
decision), the Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit resolved 
cases addressing the same issue, but in neither case did the los-
ing party file a petition for certiorari.241 In 2001, the Ninth Cir-
 
 237. 131 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 238. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2010) (per 
curiam), revisited by Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 
(2013); Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y. v. Tom F., 552 U.S. 1 (2007) (per 
curiam), revisited by Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Free 
v. Abbott Labs., Inc. 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam), revisited by Exxon Mo-
bil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Morgan Stanley & Co. 
v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins., 511 U.S. 658 (1994) (per curiam), revisited by Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); United States v. France, 498 U.S. 
335 (1991) (per curiam), revisited by Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 
(1991); Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam), revisited by Martin 
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102‐166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77, as recognized in Briscoe 
v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2011); Tompkins v. Texas, 
486 U.S. 1053 (1988), question addressed in Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 
(1998) and Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); Carpenter v. United States, 
484 U.S. 19 (1987), revisited by United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), 
as recognized by SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2006); Pension Bene-
fit Guar. Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 481 U.S. 735 (1987), revisited by 
Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. 
Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993). The Court granted certiorari in Tompkins to address 
two issues, one related to whether the Constitution required a lesser-included-
offense instruction in a capital case, which was addressed in Hopkins. See Pe-
tition for Writ of Certiorari, Tompkins v. Texas, 486 U.S. 1053 (1988) (No. 87-
6405), 1988 WL 1094066; see also Tompkins, 486 U.S. 1053 (limiting grant of 
certiorari); Hopkins, 524 U.S. 88. The second question involved the standard to 
be applied to review of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986), an issue that the Court addressed in Purkett. See Purkett, 514 
U.S. 765. 
 239. Free, 529 U.S. 333. 
 240. See Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 176 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1999); Baker, su-
pra note 4. 
 241. Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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cuit addressed the issue in Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.,242 and the 
Court denied certiorari.243 Within a year, the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue in Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc. A petition for certio-
rari was filed, but the parties subsequently asked the Court to 
dismiss the petition, which it did.244 In 2004, the Sixth Circuit 
addressed the issue in Olden v. LaFarge Corp., and the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari.245 That same year, the First and 
Eleventh Circuits addressed the issue in Rosario Ortega v. 
Star-Kist Foods, Inc. and Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon 
Corp.246 The Court granted certiorari in both cases and resolved 
the issue.247 So, the affirmance by equal division in Free delayed 
resolution of the legal issue at stake, but only by four years. 
The four-year delay following Free is the third-longest lag 
time between an affirmance by equal division and a subsequent 
case resolving the issue. Following Carpenter v. United 
States,248 the Supreme Court waited ten years to revisit the de-
gree of connection required for someone to be liable for insider 
trading under a misappropriation of information theory.249 Nine 
years following Tompkins v. Texas,250 the Supreme Court finally 
ruled on the application of the Due Process Clause to jury in-
structions on lesser-included offenses in the context of capital 
prosecutions251 (although the Court had earlier resolved a se-
cond question presented in Tompkins related to claims that a 
prosecutor used peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory 
manner).252 
 
 242. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 243. Gibson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002). 
 244. See Docket, Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01-1390 (2002). 
 245. Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 
U.S. 1152 (2005). 
 246. Rosario Ortega v. Star–Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004), 
cert. granted, 543 U.S. 924 (2004); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 
F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 924 (2004). 
 247. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
 248. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 249. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); see also SEC v. 
Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing O’Hagan). 
 250. Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754 (1989) (per curiam). The Supreme 
Court also granted certiorari to consider allegations of racially-motivated per-
emptory strikes, but that issue does not appear to be the result of a conflict of 
authority. 
 251. See Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998). The Supreme Court 
reached the same conclusion as did the lower court in Tompkins. See Tomp-
kins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc). 
 252. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam). 
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On the other hand, in several situations, the Court speedi-
ly returned to an issue presented in a case resulting in a tie 
vote. The Court revisited the issue in United States v. France 
within a mere five months.253 The time lag was about a year for 
Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance,254 about 
two years for Board of Education of City School District of City 
of New York v. Tom F.,255 and about three years for Costco 
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.256 While such delays may be re-
grettable, they hardly rise to the level of a constitutional crisis. 
Indeed, splits of authority often persist within the courts of ap-
peals for many years.257 
One final case falls into the category of situations in which 
an equally divided court did not substantially undermine doc-
trinal uniformity. Following the tie vote in Borden Ranch Part-
nership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,258 the executive 
branch amended its regulations defining a key phrase in the 
Clean Water Act, addressing the issue presented in that case.259 
In a second class of cases, the issue that divided the Su-
preme Court Justices appears to have been relatively inconse-
quential in practice. California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System v. Felzen is a good example.260 The courts of appeals dis-
agree on whether a non-named shareholder must intervene to 
appeal a judgment in a shareholder derivative action. In Felzen 
v. Andreas, the Seventh Circuit resolved that issue by requiring 
a shareholder who is not a named party to file a motion for in-
 
 253. United States v. France, 498 U.S. 335 (1991) (per curiam); see also 
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991). 
 254. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins., 511 U.S. 658 (1994) (per 
curiam); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 255. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y. v. Tom F., 552 U.S. 1 (2007) (per 
curiam); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009). 
 256. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2010) (per 
curiam); see also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 257. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 208, at 1612 (“As a practical matter, the 
federal courts are simply not capable of standardizing all federal law.”). 
 258. 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (per curiam). 
 259. In Borden Ranch, 537 U.S. 99, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to decide whether a practice of tilling agricultural land called “deep ripping” 
involved a discharge of pollutants pursuant to the Clean Water Act. See Bor-
den Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001), 
cert. granted, 536 U.S. 903 (2002). Subsequently, the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers promulgated a regulation to address that question. See 33 C.F.R. 
§ 323.2(d) (2015). 
 260. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Felzen, 525 U.S. 315 (1999) (per curiam). 
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tervention before filing an appeal.261 All other circuits to have 
considered this issue have disagreed and permitted sharehold-
ers that are not named plaintiffs to appeal.262 The Seventh Cir-
cuit has acknowledged that it may need to reconsider its rule in 
light of a Supreme Court decision in the related context of class 
action litigation.263 But this disagreement is unlikely to shape 
litigation decisions because it does not affect the rights of the 
parties to the litigation and, moreover, the Seventh Circuit re-
quires a mere formality because it has instructed district court 
judges to freely grant intervention to objecting shareholders.264 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has not had a case that cleanly 
presented the issue again, perhaps because non-named share-
holders with adequate resources to appeal a judgment also 
have resources to intervene, rendering the split in authority 
without substantial practical import. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, the Supreme Court affirmed by equal division on the 
question of whether punitive damages are available under mar-
itime law against a ship owner for the recklessness of a ship-
master.265 This issue is relatively idiosyncratic and the Court 
has not been presented with another opportunity to consider it. 
There are three cases affirmed by equal division where a 
persistent circuit split appears to remain important. In Lotus 
Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc., the 
Court granted certiorari to consider the application of copyright 
law to the menu structure of a software program.266 The courts 
have yet to settle on an approach to applying copyright law to 
software. A leading treatise on the subject explained that this 
area of law involves “inherent contradictions” and, thus, “it is 
not surprising that courts have struggled without a great deal 
 
 261. Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 262. See Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1442–43 (10th Cir. 
1995); Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 265 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 2000); Kaplan v. Rand, 
192 F.3d 60, 67–68 (2d Cir. 1999); cf. In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. Share-
holder Derivative Action, 631 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2011) (declining to decide 
whether unnamed shareholder must intervene to appeal because shareholder 
failed to timely object to settlement). 
 263. See Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley, 687 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 
2012) (citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002)). 
 264. See Crawford v. Equifax Payment Serv., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 881 (7th 
Cir. 2000). 
 265. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 471 (2008). 
 266. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996), reh’g de-
nied, 516 U.S. 1167 (1996). 
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of success to reconcile the irreconcilable.”267 Despite multiple 
opportunities to return to the subject, the Supreme Court has 
chosen to leave the lower courts to muddle their way through,268 
perhaps hoping that Congress will resolve the issue.269 Similar-
ly, the Supreme Court left undisturbed a split in the lower 
courts with its 2008 affirmance by equal division in Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Kent.270 That case involved the issue of whether 
the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act preempted a fraud 
provision of Michigan law.271 In reaching its decision, the Se-
cond Circuit explicitly disagreed with a Sixth Circuit decision 
deciding precisely the same question.272 In 2012, the Fifth Cir-
cuit addressed a provision of Texas law similar to that ad-
dressed in Warner-Lambert, but no petition for certiorari was 
filed.273 These cases do not, however, suggest that the case in 
which the Supreme Court evenly divided was itself of particu-
lar doctrinal significance. Rather, the Supreme Court has been 
provided opportunities to resolve the issues presented, but to 
date has declined to do so. That is, of course, the fate of many 
issues that divide the lower courts. The Supreme Court has a 
limited docket, and by necessity, it does not resolve every disa-
greement between the lower courts. Finally, the courts of ap-
peal continue to be in some disagreement about the available 
scope of a non-settling class member’s collateral challenge to a 
settlement as violating due process in the wake of Dow Chemi-
cal Co. v. Stephenson,274 although the disagreement appears to 
 
 267. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:70 (2013). 
 268. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (2014), cert. denied 
135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015); Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Con-
sulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied 538 U.S. 1032 (2003); 
Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1020 (1998). 
 269. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 822 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) (“[T]he majority’s result persuades me and 
its formulation is as good, if not better, than any other that occurs to me now 
as within the reach of courts. Some solutions . . . are not options at all for 
courts but might be for Congress.”). 
 270. 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (per curiam). 
 271. See Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d. Cir 2006), 
aff ’d by an equally divided court, 552 U.S. 440 (2008). 
 272. Id. at 90–93 (discussing Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961 
(6th Cir. 2004)). 
 273. Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm., 672 F.3d 372 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 274. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam). 
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be one of the degree of review, rather than whether review is 
available at all.275 
An analysis of tie votes over the last twenty-five years re-
veals few circumstances in which splits of authority have not 
subsequently been corrected. Those that linger, like Lotus De-
velopment and Warner-Lambert linger in part because of deci-
sions by the Supreme Court not to grant certiorari in subse-
quent cases and in part because some issues arise rarely. 
Dramatically changing the functioning of the Supreme Court to 
allow substitute Justices to cast tie breaking votes does not 
seem justified to correct these occasional lingering splits of rel-
atively low importance. 
V.  THE END OF THE EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT   
Where a case arises on a writ of certiorari, the Supreme 
Court should end its practice of affirming by an equally divided 
court and instead utilize a DIG to dispose of such cases. As Part 
III demonstrated, if history is indicative, this will resolve virtu-
ally every case in which a tie vote occurs. Moreover, as Part IV 
demonstrated, disposing of such cases is unlikely to create a 
significant long-term uniformity problem. 
But why should the Court abandon its centuries’ old prac-
tice and substitute one procedural disposition for another? This 
Part identifies costs imposed by affirming by equal division 
that could be ameliorated, at least in part, by deploying a DIG. 
A. PREJUDGMENT IN FUTURE CASES 
The affirmance by equal division makes no law, but may 
threaten to bias the Justices in future cases. A fundamental 
tenant of the American judicial system is that judges should 
approach each case without predetermining its result.276 This 
tenant is reflected in existing norms about when a judge should 
recuse herself,277 and in the reluctance of judges and Justices to 
firm offer opinions about contested legal issues during confir-
 
 275. See, e.g., Gooch v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 402, 421–22 (6th Cir. 
2012) (holding that an individual asserting the capacity to represent the inter-
ests of a class is properly situated to challenge a settlement that would bar the 
class’ certification). 
 276. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) 
(“If the judge discovers that some personal bias or improper consideration 
seems to be the actuating cause of the decision . . . the judge may think it nec-
essary to consider withdrawing from the case.”). 
 277. Id. 
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mation hearings.278 The Supreme Court has linked concerns 
about prejudgment to psychology, explaining that due process 
rules related to recusals relate to “a realistic appraisal of psy-
chological tendencies and human weakness.”279 
Taking cognitive psychology seriously suggests that affirm-
ing by an equally divided court is a bad practice, particularly 
since it is unnecessary. Cognitive psychology reveals that the 
inner workings of the human brain can distort thinking. These 
cognitive biases result in irrational decision-making, sometimes 
referred to as bounded rationality.280 Legal scholars have de-
tected these cognitive phenomena in judges; because, as Chris 
Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich, among the 
foremost scholars of judicial psychology, explain: “Judges, it 
seems, are human.”281 
Several cognitive tendencies may come into play with re-
gard to affirmances by equal division. First among them is the 
cognition of confirmation bias, which leads individuals to dis-
count disconfirming evidence encountered after that individual 
has made up her mind.282 In other words, confirmation bias 
causes people to tend to become close-minded and ignore new 
information once they have committed themselves to a particu-
lar position. This tendency has been detected biologically. So, 
for example, MRI brain scans demonstrate that political parti-
sans exposed to negative information about their party tend to 
discount that information.283 Creating structures minimizing 
confirmation bias is difficult, because the process of making a 
decision is internal to the individual. But casting a final vote in 
favor of a position would seem to create the groundwork for 
confirmation bias. 
 
 278. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 919, 925–28 (1995). 
 279. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883–84 (quoting Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 
35, 47 (1975)). 
 280. See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE 669, 669–70 (1996); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998); see also Justin Pidot, 
Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 235–42 (2013). 
 281. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
777, 778 (2000). 
 282. See Marsha Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1482–83 (2012). 
 283. See Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An 
fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. 
Presidential Election, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1947 (2006). 
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Cognitive dissonance may also operate to entrench the 
views of a Justice in the wake of an affirmance by equal divi-
sion.284 Cognitive dissonance is among the best-established cog-
nitive biases and describes the psychological discomfort that 
arises when an individual holds two contradictory or incon-
sistent ideas.285 Cognitive dissonance can operate to make it 
more difficult for an individual to change her mind, particularly 
where resources have already been based on an earlier view.286 
That is because adopting a new view may require acknowledg-
ment, at least internally, that that earlier commitment of re-
sources was unwise or wasteful, and that acknowledgement is 
dissonant with most individuals’ positive self-concept.287 This 
does not, of course, mean that people never change their mind. 
Rather, so long as the psychological cost of ignoring new infor-
mation and maintaining a stable view are greater than the 
cognitive benefits, the viewpoint will remain stable.288 
A related phenomenon described in the economics litera-
ture as “escalating commitment” may also be at play.289 Escalat-
ing commitment, referred to evocatively by Professor Kevin 
Lynch in the context of legal studies as the “lock-in effect,” re-
fers to the tendency of individuals to exhibit an increasing ded-
ication to a previously adopted position that had real conse-
quences in the face of mounting disconfirming evidence.290 
 
 284. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
50–52 (1957) (analyzing empirical data regarding the role of cognitive disso-
nance in decision-making). 
 285. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment, 36 
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 702–03 (2009). 
 286. See Benjamin Gilad et al., Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximi-
zation, 8 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 61, 67 (1987) (“Under cognitive dissonance, 
commitments already made are harder to reverse than they were to make.”). 
 287. See, e.g., CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE 
(BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND 
HURTFUL ACTS 13–14 (2007). 
 288. Discounting dissonant information can be predicted by models of utili-
ty maximization. As Benjamin Gilad and his colleagues explained, “It is easy 
to see that a [utility-]maximizing individual should . . . balance the expected 
cost of continuing to block dissonant information . . . with the expected bene-
fits in terms of self-image . . . associated with not admitting that the original 
commitment was wrong.” Gilad et al., supra note 286. 
 289. See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Es-
calating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
PERFORMANCE 27, 27 (1976); see also Gilad et al., supra note 286, at 68 (ex-
plaining that cognitive dissonance “is the essence of the ‘escalating commit-
ment’ paradigm . . . in which subjects were found to escalate investment and 
become locked into a losing course of action as a result of the need to justify.”). 
 290. Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. 
  
290 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 101:245 
 
Experimental work has found evidence of the lock-in effect in a 
range of situations, including investment, hiring, and policy 
choices.291 The explanation of the effect is multifaceted, but in-
volves both external and internal self-justification: On the one 
hand, people convince themselves of their own rationality when 
they act consistently.292 On the other hand, consistent action 
“attempt[s] to demonstrate rationality to others or to prove to 
others that a costly error was really the correct decision over a 
longer term perspective.”293 
Professor Kevin Lynch has hypothesized that the lock-in 
effect may influence the view of a judge on the merits of a case 
after that judge rules on a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.294 Professor Shay Lavie has found evidence of the “lock-in” 
effect in an empirical study of appellate court decisions.295 The 
upshot of the lock-in effect is straightforward, a decision with 
tangible consequences exerts a psychological influence on fu-
ture decisions, even if the decision-maker is presented with 
new evidence or new circumstances supporting a change of 
course. 
Justice William Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Ohio v. 
Price, a case in which the court affirmed by equal division, sug-
gests that the Justices themselves are attentive to the potential 
risk of the lock-in effect once they have publicly cast votes.296 
Writing for himself and three other Justices, Justice Brennan 
explains that the “practice of not expressing opinions upon an 
equal division has the salutary force of preventing the identifi-
cation of the Justices holding the differing views as to the issue, 
and this may well enable the next case presenting it to be ap-
 
L. REV. 779, 783–84 (2014); see also Staw, supra note 289. 
 291. See Brian C. Gunia et al., Vicarious Entrapment: Your Sunk Costs, My 
Escalation of Commitment, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1238 (2009) 
(discussing the lock-in effect in investment and hiring situations); Barry M. 
Staw & Jerry Ross, Commitment to a Policy Decision: A Multi-Theoretical Per-
spective, 23 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 40, 40 (1978). 
 292. See Staw & Ross, supra note 291, at 45–46. 
 293. See Staw, supra note 289, at 42. 
 294. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 290, at 804–09. 
 295. Shay Lavie, Are Judges Tied to the Past? Evidence from Jurisdiction 
Cases, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 337, 339 (2014). Notably, Lavie finds that judicial 
behavior may even be influenced by decisions by other judges that result in a 
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proached with less commitment.”297 A similar view was ex-
pressed in the dissent of a Judge James Ervin III in United 
States v. Hamrick, where he explained: 
[I]t has been the practice of the Supreme Court in every instance [of a 
tie] that my research has disclosed to go no further than to state that 
the Court was equally divided . . . . This practice comports with the 
view . . . that when a court is unable to obtain a majority of judges 
voting for the same result, the better course is not to speak at all, for 
it cannot fulfill its responsibility to provide guidance to lower 
courts.298 
These cognitive effects—confirmation bias, cognitive disso-
nance, and the lock-in effect, are not, of course, absolute. People 
do, after all, change their minds. Affirming by equal division 
may needlessly trigger these effects, however, because the vote 
of each Justice on the merits of the case has a practical conse-
quence on that case’s outcome. In other words, casting votes in 
cases that result in ties, like in all cases, has consequences. 
These cognitive biases are likely to be strongest when Justices 
publicly disclose their votes. As Part II demonstrates, this oc-
curs rarely. Even votes hidden from the public eye may, howev-
er, exert psychological influence because the Justices have gone 
on the record with each other. On the other hand, consensus 
that a DIG is the appropriate resolution of a case where a tie 
vote emerges may reduce these cognitive pressures and lead to 
fairer treatment of future cases. 
B. LEGITIMACY OF THE COURT 
Affirming by equal division may also threaten to further 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of the Supreme Court at a 
time when the public support for the institution is already at 
record lows.299 This danger presents itself in three ways: First, 
tie votes further a narrative about the Court as inappropriately 
political. Second, they may cause a public perception of pre-
judgment (in addition to risking actual prejudgment). Third, 
they encourage unseemly gamesmanship. 
The legitimacy of American courts arises in part from their 
history of good service and in part from a cultural mythology. 
Despite evidence to the contrary, Americans have traditionally 
viewed judges as impartial and objective, applying law rather 
 
 297. Id. 
 298. United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 892 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995) (Ervin, 
J., dissenting). 
 299. See McCarthy, supra note 13. 
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than making policy,300 although that view is changing.301 We ex-
pect judges to think first and foremost about things that are 
larger than themselves—for example, justice, law, and their in-
stitutional credibility.302 
In contrast, the Court looks petty, rather than august, 
when the Justices deadlock and thereby release an order af-
firming by equal division. Disagreement, in such circumstanc-
es, thwarts the Court’s institutional role, to decide the cases 
that come before it. It causes legal observers to shake their col-
lective heads, as Thomas Baker did following Free v. Abbott 
Laboratories. Baker argued that “the Justices should have sup-
pressed their individuality and independence for the sake of the 
federal court system at large.”303 Martha Davis expressed simi-
lar, thinly veiled contempt for the Court’s affirmance by equal 
division in Flores-Villar v. United States, stating: “With this 
anonymous 4-4 split, in which none of the Justices revealed 
their individual votes and the entire opinion consisted of a sin-
gle sentence, the lower court’s opinion was summarily affirmed 
and the discriminatory law was upheld.”304 
Where individual Justices reveal their votes when the 
court affirms by equal division, this threatens to further un-
dermine the Court’s legitimacy by suggesting that the Justices 
have prejudged a future case presenting the same issue. The 
practices of Justices typically avoid such expressions of view.305 
For example, Justices routinely refuse to publicly express views 
about unresolved legal questions.306 This predilection is dis-
 
 300. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
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Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1633 (2010) (de-
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played most acutely during the confirmation hearing process, 
where Justices routinely decline to answer questions about le-
gal issues that may come before the Court.307 Indeed, in her dis-
senting opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that “every Member of [the 
Supreme Court] declined to furnish such information to the 
Senate.”308 
The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct similarly concerns itself with statements of pre-
commitment. Rule 2.11 requires a judge to “disqualify himself 
or herself” if “[t]he judge, while a judge or judicial candidate, 
has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, 
judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit 
the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular 
way in the proceeding or controversy.”309 The rule does not ap-
ply to the Supreme Court and would not constrain courts from 
issuing affirmance by equal division in any case, but nonethe-
less acknowledges the risks of public adoption of positions. 
Finally, affirmances by equal division encourage litigation 
gamesmanship. The Court always releases one piece of infor-
mation when it divides evenly: the identity of any recused Jus-
tice. Any savvy lawyer will recognize the importance of that in-
formation.310 In a future case presenting the same issue, that 
Justice will become the dominant target for persuasion. Peeling 
back the Court’s mask in this way and inviting strategic argu-
mentation targeted at a single Justice not yet committed to a 
viewpoint can only further a cynical view of the Court.311 
 
 307. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 807–08 n.1 
(2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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While cases ending in tie votes are rare, and many fly be-
low the radar, the procedure is unnecessary and bolsters cyni-
cism about the Court, which should be particularly troubling to 
the Justices given current trends in public opinion. Replacing 
ties with DIGs may make only a modest difference, but it car-
ries with it no costs. 
C. DESTABILIZING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Affirming by equal division creates doctrinal instability 
when the tie vote relates to subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court has only engaged in this practice on one occa-
sion, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut.312 Jurisdic-
tion issues, however, often prove divisive among the Justices, 
and now that the precedent has been set, the potential exists 
for future jurisdictional issues to be resolved in similar fash-
ion.313 
The destabilizing effect of a tie vote on jurisdictional doc-
trines arises out of the long-standing rule that every federal 
court has an “independent obligation to assure [itself] that ju-
risdiction is proper.”314 This obligation is nonwaivable, and a 
court must establish jurisdiction before proceeding to the mer-
its of a case.315 In other words, the Court must affirmatively es-
tablish jurisdiction, and yet, the Court has explained that “no 
affirmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are 
equally divided.”316 The American Electric Power decision then 
can only logically be understood as undermining fundamental 
rules about subject matter jurisdiction,317 or implying that in 
some instances tie votes can result in an affirmative act on the 
part of the Court. 
The American Electric Power decision may, in the end, be 
sui generis, but it sets a dangerous precedent. Lower courts 
have long sought mechanisms to avoid difficult jurisdictional 
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determination,318 and the American Electric Power case may 
provide new fuel for this endeavor. While some scholars cele-
brate the potential for the case to erode the rule that standing 
must be decided first,319 it seems more likely that the decision 
will create confusion. Regardless, the independent obligation of 
courts to establish jurisdiction plays an important role in keep-
ing the federal courts within their sphere of constitutional pow-
er, and the Court’s ambivalence about that rule in the Ameri-
can Electric Power case may destabilize that rule.320 
  CONCLUSION   
Nothing good comes from a tie vote in the Supreme Court. 
Fortunately, the Justices rarely split evenly on the judgment in 
a case. But when they do, this Article contends they should 
DIG the case, rather than affirming by equal division. 
The Justices could achieve this shift in procedure without 
any change to jurisdictional statutes or modification of Court 
rule. The Court typically requires a supermajority vote to DIG 
a case and will do so only because of changed circumstances.321 
Should the Justices agree, they could unanimously DIG a case 
where the Court teeters on the brink of a tie vote. Moreover, 
DIGing would seem to reduce the likelihood that any one Jus-
tice would opine on the merits of the case, because any opinion 
written in the context of a DIG would ordinarily be confined to 
the propriety of the dismissal.322 
DIGing would be as effective a means of disposing of a sin-
gle issue presented in a larger case as would the affirmance by 
an equally divided Court. While the Court has rarely used a 
DIG to dispose of a single issue, the prevalence of such situa-
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tions is similar in magnitude to the prevalence of opinions af-
firming a single issue by equal division. Professors Michael 
Solimine and Rafael Gely identified fifteen DIGs of the 155 
they studied that dismissed part of a case.323 My data set re-
veals that the Court has affirmed by equal division part of a 
case fourteen out of 164 times.324 
On the exceptionally rare occasion that a tie vote occurs in 
a case that arises under the Supreme Court’s mandatory appel-
late jurisdiction, a DIG will not be possible.325 Such an event 
has occurred exactly once since 1925, and the Court should not 
allow the mere possibility that it must affirm by equal division 
in such a case in the future to prevent it from adopting a pref-
erable procedure for the vast majority of such cases. 
The Supreme Court will inevitably consider cases without 
a full complement of Justices, and sometimes such cases will 
result in a tie vote. When that eventuality comes to pass, the 
Justices would do well to dismiss the case. Dismissal would 
have the same legal effect as the current practice of affirming 
by equal division, but by choosing to DIG, the Court may ame-
liorate the harmful consequences of the latter practice. 
  EPILOGUE   
Since this Article was virtually completed, the Supreme 
Court concluded its 2015 October Term. More than eighty per-
cent of the decisions for this Term were decided after Justice 
Scalia’s death.326 Five of those opinions involved tie votes.327 Be-
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cause two of those cases were among the most closely watched 
cases of the term, the practice of affirming by an equally divid-
ed court has been catapulted into the limelight. There have 
been more newspaper articles published about tie votes in the 
Supreme Court in the last four months than had been pub-
lished between January 1, 1978 (the beginning of the Lexis 
newspaper database) and the date of Justice Scalia’s death.328 
Tie votes are no longer of interest primarily to Supreme Court 
insiders, but have captured public attention and the headlines 
of major newspapers around the country.329 This glut of atten-
tion only magnifies the fears this Article expressed about tie 
votes threatening public perceptions about the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court. 
By the numbers, the October Term 2015 is something of an 
outlier, but not extremely so. No more than two tie votes have 
occurred in any year since 1989, but that year experienced five 
tie votes and there have been others with similar numbers. The 
cases also fall within the pattern of the 164 cases involving a 
tie vote between 1925 and 2015. All five arose under the Su-
preme Court’s discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Four of the 
five took the form of a one sentence per curium decision simply 
announcing that a tie had occurred. In the fifth, Franchise Tax 
Board of California v. Hyatt, the Justices deadlocked on a sig-
nificant preliminary issue, but ultimately a majority of the 
court disposed of the case on a secondary issue of lesser im-
portance.330 
While it is too soon to know the lasting doctrinal im-
portance of these cases, there is reason to believe that they are 
unlikely to create prolonged splits of authority. At the very 
least, the Supreme Court is likely to have ample opportunity to 
revisit the questions presented in these cases should they so 
desire. United States v. Texas is perhaps the easiest example 
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for this opportunity.331 The case involved a district court grant-
ing a nationwide preliminary injunction against the Obama 
Administration’s decision to defer deportation for certain clas-
ses of immigrants within in the United States without legal au-
thorization. The tie vote that terminated the case, leaving the 
injunction in place, immediately and dramatically affects the 
millions of people who were eligible for deferred deportation. In 
other words, the real world significance is dramatic. But be-
cause the case involved only a preliminary injunction, the Su-
preme Court will have a second opportunity to review the legal-
ity of the deferred deportation plan after the Fifth Circuit 
renders its decision on the merits. The Court is also likely to be 
presented with another opportunity relatively soon to address 
the issue in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association be-
cause cases related to the public sector unions appear to be in 
no short supply.332 
What sets the tie votes of October Term 2015 apart is that 
they have involved highly contentious and closely watched cas-
es. This is particularly true of two of the decisions. United 
States v. Texas involved the Obama Administration’s signature 
policy on immigration, which deferred deportation for individu-
als within the United States without legal authorization who 
are parents of citizens of lawful permanent residents.333 The de-
cision garnered widespread attention and even prompted a 
swift response from President Obama, who described it as 
“heartbreaking for the millions of immigrants who have made 
their lives here.”334 The Friedrichs case was also carefully 
watched and considered among the most important cases of the 
term.335 
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While the Court issued particularly high profile affirmanc-
es by equal division this year, other decisions indicated that the 
Justices may be aware that tie votes threaten their credibility 
with the public. While the Court issued no DIG in a case that 
divided them, in two cases it issued unusual orders to effective-
ly punt cases that appeared headed for a deadlock. In Zubik v. 
Burwell, the Court considered several consolidated challenges 
to the contraceptive mandate contained within the Affordable 
Care Act.336 Rather than affirming the lower court decisions by 
equal division, the Court issued an order after oral argument 
requesting supplemental briefing on means of accommodating 
the religious views of the plaintiffs that had never been raised 
by any party.337 The Court then issued an order remanding the 
cases to allow the lower courts to consider the views expressed 
in the supplemental briefs.338 In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the 
Court again remanded to the lower court without offering a 
view on the legal issue presented.339 It’s hard to understand ei-
ther of these orders as anything other than an effort on the 
part of the Justices to avoid a tie vote. 
The Senate appears unlikely to confirm a ninth Justice in 
the near future and, as a result, October Term 2016 will pre-
sent the Court will new opportunities to either divide evenly or 
to find other means of disposing of cases. To avoid further erod-
ing public confidence in the institution, the Court should seek 
out those other means. This Article suggests that the DIG may 
provide one such avenue for consensus rather than division. In 
light of the decisions in Zubik and Spokeo, this suggestion may 
find fertile ground among the Justices. 
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